The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of the Limitation Act in the context of mortgage suits, specifically the calculation of the limitation period and its impact on the plaintiff's right to sue for recovery of possession and redemption.

Reuben, J.

1. These two appeals are directed against a decision of the Subordinate Judge at Hazaribagh dated 22nd December 1945, decreeing in part a suit impugning the validity of three mortgage decrees and the sales held in execution thereof.

2. Three simple mortgage bonds were executed on 10th July 1910, each hypothecating a one-third milkiat share in villages Dania, Lalpania and Khakhanda in the jurisdiction of Police Station Gomia to secure a sum of Rs. 2,200. The mortgagors sold their entire interest in these villages to the late Kalachand Chakravarty, father of the plaintiff, by a sale-deed dated 23rd March 1914. The mortgagors (mortgagees) sued on their bonds and obtained decrees for sale in Mortgage Suits No. 123 of 1917, 48 of 1918 and 49 of 1919. The property hypothecated was sold in execution of these decrees on 3rd February 1920, 4th February 1921 and 4th July 1921, respectively. In each case, the purchasers were the mortgagees decred-holders who subsequently transferred their rights under the purchase to Ram Ratan Bhagat, who was himself a joint decree-holder. Defendant 3 is the heir of Ram Ratan Bhagat and big possession over the property is admitted. The plaintiff sued for a declaration of the nullity of the mortgage decrees and the sales thereunder and for recovery of the property. The validity of the decree and sale in Mortgage Suit no. 123 is challenged on the ground that the final decree was passed and the execution was levied against Kalachand after his death, in Mortgage Suit No. 48 on the ground that the plaintiff was not impleaded either in the suit or the execution and in Mortgage Suit no. 49 on the ground that the plaintiff, then a minor, was not properly represented and, in the alternative, that there was gross negligence on the part of his guardian ad litem. In addition, there was a prayer for a decree for redemption of the simple mortgages.

3. The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit in respect of mortgage Suit No. 123 of 1917 accepting as established the allegations of the plaintiff. He has held that the plaintiff was properly represented in the other two suits, and has refused relief in respect thereof. Hence, the pre-sent appeals. Defendant 2 is the appellant in Appeal No. 56 and the plaintiff in Appeal No. 93.

4. The first hurdle in the way of the plaintiff is that of limitation. He was a minor when the sales in question took place, and it is admitted that by the time he attained his majority on 4th May 1940, the period of limitation for the filing of a suit for recovery of possession had expired. Under Sec. 6 read with Section 8, Limitation Act, the period of limitation for the filing of a suit was extended by three years. This suit was filed on 5th May 1943. In holding that limitation is saved, the learned Subordinate Judge reckoned this period of three years from the date of attainment of majority, and excluded this date itself under the provisions of Sec.12 of the Act. It appears to me that there are two mistakes in his reckoning. Under Sec. 6, Sub-section (1), a person labouring under a disability is entitled to institute a suit within the same period "after the disability has ceased" as would otherwise have been allowed under Schedule l to the Act. Under Section 8 the extension of time given by Sec. 6 shall not extend for more than three years "from the cessation of the disability." The three year period, therefore, must be counted, not from the date of attainment of majority, but from the date of the cessation of minority. In this case the cessation of minority occurred on 3rd May 1940, and the three-year period began to run on 4th May. Sec.12 provides that, in computing limitation, "the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded." This would exclude 3rd May. According to the Subordinate Judge, 4th May was to be excluded. Even so, the period of three years would commence on 5th May 1940, and would expire at the last moment of 4th May 1913. Under the provisions of