The main legal point established in the judgment is the distinction between possession and title in the context of quarrying rights, where the appellant, as a mere local agent, had no right of suit with regard to upper Murli hill, but made out a prima facie case of title and serious injury likely to follow if no injunction was granted with regard to lower Murli hill.

1. This is an appeal from an order dated 21st September 1949, of the learned Subordinate Judge of Sasaram, rejecting an application for an ad interim order of injunction made by the plaintiff of Title Suit No. 51 of 1949 pen-ding before the said Subordinate Judge. The plaintiff-petitioner is the appellant before us. The respondents, who were defendants in the action, are (1) the Province of Bihar, (2) the Collector of Shahabad, (3) the Additional Sub-divisional Officer, Sasaram and (4) Dalmia Jain and Co. Ltd.

2. The material facts are the following: The appellant styling himself as the proprietor of Kuchwar Lime and Stone Company (which company has to be distinguished from Messrs. Kuchwar Lime and Stone Company Limited, now in voluntary liquidation) brought the suit for a declaration that he is entitled to quarry lime Stone and manufacture lime from certain properties known as upper Murli hill and lower Murli hill, with details of area, boundaries, etc., mentioned in a schedule appended to the plaint, and for a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from dispossessing, or disturbing the possession of, the plaintiff from the said properties. The allegations made by the appellant in his plaint were of the following nature. It was alleged that with regard to upper Murli hill, which has an area of about 137 acres, the appellant was the local agent of Messrs. Kachwar Lime and Stone Company Ltd., now in voluntary liquidation (hereinafter to be referred to as the lessee company for brevity and convenience). On 1st April 1928. the Secretary of State of India in Council, the then competent authority, gave a lease to the lessee company in respect of the said 137 acres, being the upper portion of Murli hill, with amongst other rights, the right to quarry lime stone and convert it into lime and do all acts necessary for the extraction of the stone or the manufacture of lime including the erection on the land leased of buildings and plants required for these purposes. There were various other clauses in the lease providing for the payment of rent and royalty with which we are not at present concerned except one clause, Clause 20. This clause was a renewal clause and read as follows;

"That on the expiration of the period of this lease the lessee may, if it has duly observed all the foregoing conditions, have a renewal of the lease on terms to be agreed upon by the Collector and the lessee, subject to the approval of the Commissioner."

The lease was for a period of twenty years commencing from 1st April 1928, and ending on 31st March 1948. The lessee company went into voluntary liquidation in 1933, and on 30th September 1933, there was a deed of agreement between the liquidators and the appellant, the liquidators being Messrs. Lovelock and Lewes, Chartered Accountants of Calcutta. This agreement of 1933 does not appear to have been printed in the paper book, but was the subject-matter of protracted litigation resulting in the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Secretary of State V/s. Kuchwar Lime & Stone Co. Ltd., 65 I. A. 45 : (A. I. R. (25) 1938 P. C. 20). In the lease of 1928, there was a clause against transfer or assignment without the assent of the Board of Revenue, and the penalty for an infringement of this clause was forfeiture of the lease. The agreement of 1933, which the lessee company made in favour of the appellant, was treated by the Board of Revenue as a sub. lease without the Boards assent, resulting in forfeiture of the lease. The lessee company then brought a suit in 1934 (Title Suit no. 39 of 1934) against the Province of Bihar and its officers. This litigation ultimately went up to the Privy Council, the decision of which we have already referred to above. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that the deed of agreement dated 30th September 1933, in favour of the present appellant did not constitute a sub-lease, but created an agency in favour of the appellant with regard