The phrase "defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature" in Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act should be interpreted broadly to include cases where the court is unable to entertain an application due to a defect in the application or other similar reasons.

B.P.Sinha, J.

1. This is an application under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in making the application for review of a judgment of this Court.

2. During the course of the argument, it appeared to me that this was really not a case for condonation of delay under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. I pointed out to Sir Sultan Ahmad that the application really turned on the interpretation of sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. If the case could come within the purview of sec. 14, the application would be in time, and, the petitioners need not have taken recourse to the provisions of sec. 5 of the Limitation Act: if, on the other hand, the case did not attract the provisions of sec. 14, it will be necessary for the petitioners successfully to bring the case within the purview of sec. 5, as will presently appear.

3. The facts relevant to the present application are stated below. On the 10th of May, 1949, this Court delivered the judgment. On the 8th of June, 1949, the decree of this Court was sealed and signed. On the 14th of June, 1949, an application was made to this Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court. This application stood dismissed on the 25th of January, 1950. On the 25th of February, 1950, an application for special leave was made to the Supreme Court, which rejected the application on the 9th of May, 1950. The application for review of judgment was made on the 19th of July this year, just on the re-opening day after the long vacation. It will be observed, on a reference to the dates aforesaid, that, if the time occupied in prosecuting the application for leave to appeal in this Court and for the special leave to appeal in the Supreme Court were excluded, the last date for making the application for review of judgment would fall during the long vacation, and that, therefore, the application presented on the 19th July, 1950, would be in time.

4. Hence, it is necessary to consider the provisions of sec. 14 (2) in this connection. There can be no doubt that the applicants had been prosecuting, with due diligence, their application for leave to appeal filed in this Court and the application for special leave filed in the Supreme Court against the same party. But the question is : Were the petitioners prosecuting those applications "for the same relief" for which he has made the application for review of judgment ? In my opinion the relief prayed for in the application for review of judgment is substantially the same as that prayed for in the application for leave to appeal the objective in each case being the reversal of the judgment of this Court. Though it may be said that the immediate relief in the application for leave to appeal in this Court or in the Supreme Court was for permission to lodge the appeal, the ultimate objective certainly was the reversal of the judgment to be appealed from.

5. But it has been argued on behalf of the respondents opposite party that it cannot be said that those applications, which proved in-fructuous, were being prosecuted in good faith, because, it was argued, according to the definition of "good faith" in Sec.2 of the Limitation Act, the application was not being prosecuted with due care and attention. In this connection, it was urged that the valuation of the relief sought in this case was under ten thousand rupees, and that, therefore, the petitioners could have known that they could not succeed in getting the necessary leave without making out a substantial question of law. But, in my opinion, there is no substance in this contention. The petitioners were out to make out substantial questions of law. It is true they failed in doing so; but the ultimate result of the proceedings cannot determine the bona fides of the party. The petitioners were being advised by eminent counsel, and had left no stone unturned to obtain the relief asked for. The petitioners may have been too optimistic; but that consideration cannot affect their bona fides.

6. The most serious