The word "occupation" in Section 11(3) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1947, does not cover the case of a landlord who intends to demolish the existing building and erect a new one for installing a petrol pump as an agent of an oil company.

Ramaswami, J.

1. The question to be examined in this case is whether the petnrs. are entitled to be granted a temporary injunction against the oposite party restraining the latter from executing the order of eviction made by the House Controller, Monghyr.

2. The petnrs. alleged that they were the tenants of the house in dispute which belonged to one Khan Bahadur Mirja Noor Beg; that on 16-4-1949, Jaldhar Prasad & Dasrath Prasad purchased the house & on 6-8-1949, the opposite party filed an appln. under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Bent & Eviction) Control Act (Act III [3] of 1947) for evicting the petnrs. The opposite party alleged that they had purchased the holding for the construction of a petrol pump & Dist Mag. of Monghyr bad granted a "no objection" certificate for the construction & installation of the petrol pump. On 11-3-1950, the House Controller, Mr. S. N. Mallik, allowed the appln. & ordered the petnrs. to vacate the house. An appeal was filed before the of Bhagalpur, who by his order dated 16-5-1950 rejected the appeal. On 31-5-1950, the petnrs. filed a suit for declaration & permanent injunction against the opposite party on the ground that the House Controller had no jurisdiction to make an order of eviction Under sec. 11, Sub-section (3), Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1947. On 1-6-1950, the petnrs. asked for issue of an ad interim injunction against the opposite party restraining the latter from executing the order of eviction. The learned Munsif refused to grant ad interim injunction, which order was upheld by the learned Dist., J. in appeal.

3. In support of this rule, the learned Advocate-General stressed the argument that there was a fair & substantial question at issue between the parties; that the petnrs. would suffer irreparable damage if temporary injunction be not granted & that the lower Cts. had acted in an arbitrary manner & refused to grant the injunction asked for.

4. In my opinion, the argument of the learned Advocate-General is well founded & must prevail. It is important to notice that in para. 6 of the plaint the petnrs. had asserted that the order of eviction made by the House Controller was illegal & without jurisdiction for the reason that the Standard Vacuum Oil Company had obtained the "no objection" certificate & would also construct the petrol pump &

"the defts. will become the companys tenants & pay rent to the company for the pump, & the defts. on the other hand would be getting a certain amount of rent from the company only for the land given or leased out to the company."

In the written statement, the opposite party-asserted that

"they require the premises bona fide for their personal use for carrying on the business of Agency in petrol & mobil oil, & though the pump will be supplied by the company, the land & house belong to the petnrs. & shall remain their property and the business shall be the personal business of the defts. as Agents of the Standard Vacuum Oil Co. Ltd., & even alter the termination of the Agency, if it at all happens at any future date, the house & land shall remain the property of the defts."

It should also be noticed that in the order of eviction, the House Controller has overruled the objection of the petnrs. on the ground that though "the premises if the petrol pump is installed will be only on hire to the Standard Vacuum Oil Co. for their use." Sub-section (3) of Sec.11 would be applicable & the tenants ought to be evicted from the house in dispute. In another portion of the order, the House Controller has said that though the Standard Vacuum Oil Co. would be in occupation of the building

"that will be through the petnr. himself. In that case also it can be safely held that the landlord requires the building reasonably & in good faith for his own occupation."

The question for decision in this suit would, therefore, arise whether the word "occupation" in Sub-section (3) of Sec.11 of the (Act III [3] of 1947) covers, on proper c