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1950 Supreme(Pat) 47

PATNA HIGH COURT
V.Ramaswami and Narayan JJ.
Mohammad Jamil Ahmad
Versus
Suraj Narain Pd.
A.F.A.O. No. 113 of 1948 ;
Decided On : FEBRUARY 28, 1950

S. 11 (1) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 bars the execution of a decree for ejectment, even if it had been obtained before the Act had come into force.

Headnote:

EJECTMENT - BIHAR BUILDINGS (LEASE, RENT AND EVICTION) CONTROL ACT, 1947 - S. 11 - EXECUTION OF DECREE - BAR - DECREE FOR EJECTMENT PASSED BEFORE ACT - EXECUTION AFTER ACT - NOT PERMISSIBLE.

Fact of the Case:

The appellants obtained a decree for ejectment and arrears of rent against the respondent in 1944. The execution of the decree was delayed due to objections raised by the respondent, who contended that he could not be evicted in view of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (Act III [3] of 1947). The lower courts upheld the respondent's contention.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that S. 11 (1) of the Act barred the execution of the decree, even if it had been obtained before the Act had come into force. The court reasoned that the language of the section was perfectly general and there was nothing in the section itself to confine it to decrees passed subsequent to the Act. The court also held that the term "tenant" in S. 11 ought to be construed with reference to S. 2 (h) of the Act, which defined "tenant" as including a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favor.

Issues: Whether the appellants were entitled to execute the decree for ejectment against the respondent with respect to a house in the town of Patna.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that S. 11 (1) of the Act barred the execution of the decree, even if it had been obtained before the Act had come into force. The court reasoned that the language of the section was perfectly general and there was nothing in the section itself to confine it to decrees passed subsequent to the Act. The court also held that the term "tenant" in S. 11 ought to be construed with reference to S. 2 (h) of the Act, which defined "tenant" as including a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favor.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal with costs.

Judgment

RAMASWAMI, J.

1. The question which arises for decision in this appeal is whether the appellants are entitled to execute the decree for ejectment against the respondent with respect to a house in the town of Patna.

2. The material facts are not controverted. In 1944, the appellants instituted a suit and on 22-4-1944 obtained a decree for ejectment and for arrears of rent against the respondent. The appellants applied for executing the decree but in view of certain objections taken by the respondent the execution was delayed. The latest contention of the respondent was that in view of S. 11, Bihar Buildings (Lease, Bent and Eviction) Control Act (Act III [3] of 1947) the appellants cannot obtain possession of the house. The contention has been upheld by the lower Courts.

3. In support of the appeal Mr. M. Rahman addressed the argument that the Bihar Buildings Control Aot (Act III [3] of 1947) was not retrospective in its effect, that the appellants had instituted the suit and obtained the decree long before the date when the Act came into force and that the lower Courts ought not to have refused to execute the decree. Learned counsel referred to Kishori Lal V/s. Debi Prasad, A. I. E. (37) 1850 Pat. 50 in which the Fall Bench that the definition of the word "tenant" in S. 2 (h) of the Act was not retrospective in its operation. In the order of reference Sinha and Mahabir Prasad JJ. noticed the conflict between Shive- swar V/s. Parmeshwar, 27 Pat. 1 and Sant kuer v. Ganesh, 27 Pat. 695. In the former case, Manohar Lall and Imam JJ. held that Bihar Act III [3] of 1947 was not retrospective. In the latter case Imam and Narayan JJ. decided on similar facts that the provisions of Bihar Act in [3] of 1947 were retrospective. In the order of reference therefore the following question was formulated for the decision of the Full Bench whether the definition of the word "tenant" in Bihar Act III [3] of 1947 or the Bihar Ordinance II of 1946, which it "replaced is retrospective in its operation". All the Judges of the Full Bench answered this question to the effect that the definition was not retrospective. At page 59 the learned Chief Justice states:

"I must confess that I do not understand the purport of this question. Obviously the definition of tenant in the Ordinance of 1916 and the Act of 1947 did not apply to the House-rent Control Order of 1942. Neither the Ordinance nor the Act purports to amend the deSnition of tenant in the Order of 1942, either retrospectively or otherwise."

Meredith J. (as he then was) states as follows :

"Question (1)I find nothing in the definition of tenant or anywhere in the Act to make the definition retrospective. The wide definition, in my opinion, only comes into foroe with the Act. Sec.11 of the Act is relied on. The first sub-section provides that: Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement or law to the contrary and subject to the provisions of S. 12, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to be evicted therefrom, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except, in certain specified cases. I do not think this should be taken to enact anything more than it expresBly says, and what it says in effect is that from 15-3-1947, the tenant cannot be evicted, except under the Act, even in execution of a decree. That is to say, if a landlord has obtained a decree before that date, he cannot execute it after that date. If he has a suit pending on that date, then the Aot will be retrospective in this senBe only that the Court cannot give deoree for eviction except under the conditions specified in sub-s, (1). That follows from the use of the words he shall not be liable to be evicted, which may be taken to mean that no deoree for eviction shall be passed. If any deoree is passed, it is useless because it cannot be executed."

As a member of the Full Bench I had also held that the definition of the word "tenant" in the Act was not retrospective.

4 But the aut


















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