The Government has a wide and unfettered discretion under the proviso to Sec.10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to refer or not to refer a dispute to a Tribunal.

Meredith, J.

1. This is an application under Article 226 of Indian Constitution for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus upon the State Government of Bihar directing it to refer an industrial dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication under the proviso to Sec.10 (1), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act xiv [14] of 1947).

2. The petitioner is the Vice-President of the Wire Products Labour Union, Jamshedpur, which, it is stated, is a registered trade union and has a membership of over 2000 workers who are employed in the Indian Steel and Wire Products Limited, which is a public utility service.

3. The facts stated in the petition may be summarised as follows : In the year 1947, an award was given by the Chairman, Industrial Tribunal, who decided inter alia that the management and the Union should evolve through mutual consultation a suitable wage structure for the workmen. One Mr. John was then the President of the Union, and he agreed to a wage structure which was later enforced by the management some time in February 1949. This wage structure was detrimental to the interests of the workers and had not been sanctioned either by the executive committee of the Union or its general body. Accordingly, the workers, through their executive committee, passed a vote of non-confidence against Mr. John and the other office bearers of the Union in April 1949, and elected one Munshi Ahmad Din as their President and other trade union workers allied to the socialist party of India as office bearers, including the petitioner as Vice-President. On 26th July 1949, the Union addressed a letter to the management asking that the question of wage structure might be re-opened. But this proposal was rejected. It is further stated that a number of items of the award of 1947 had not been given effect to by the management, and the Union forwarded a list of the outstanding grievances of the workers to the management and requested immediate attention to be paid to them, failing which the Union would take such steps as it thought fit. As this was not accepted by the management on 19th September 1949, notice was served on the managing director under Sub-section (1) of Sec.22, Industrial Disputes Act, stating that a strike would be organised on and from Friday the 14th October 1949. A Conciliation Officer attempted to arrive at a settlement but failed, and the Conciliation Officer intimated this failure to the Government, But on 18th October 1949, the Government informed the Union by telegram that it had decided not to refer the dispute to a Board or Tribunal as it considered it inexpedient to do so. The strike of the workers commenced on 14th October 1949, and continued for 75 days, on which date the Deputy Commissioner of Jamshedpur declared the strike illegal, whereupon the Union called off the strike.

4. It is stated that the Government acted mala fide in refusing to refer the dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication, and therefore, did not carry out its legal duty under Sec.10.

5. The first question is whether the Court has any power to issue writs or directions in a matter of this kind which cannot be said to involve the enforcement of the fundamental rights laid down in part III of the Constitution.Article 226 (1) is in these terms ;

"226 (1). Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders, or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose."

Reliance is placed on the words "and for any other purpose." It is quite clear that these words have been added advisedly and must mean something in addition to the enforcement of the rights conferred by part III, and