A lease for an indefinite period granted by a raiyat under Sec. 46 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act is invalid and the possession of the alienee becomes adverse to the raiyat from the very beginning.

Chatterji, J.

1. This is an appeal under Clause la of the Letters Patent by the defendants in a suit for ejectment. Admittedly the suit land forms part of an occupancy holding of the plaintiffs, the incidents of which are governed by the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act. The plaintiffs case was that about 10 years ago Rachhi Singh, deceased father of defendant No. 1 and husband of defendant No. 2, took dar-raiyati settlement of the suit land from the plaintiffs and about 6 years ago he built a house-on a part of the suit land on condition that the house would toe demolished and the suit land restored to its former condition and delivered to the plaintiffs on demand. After the death of Rachhi Singh, the defendants have been in possession of the suit land. On 16th of July, 1945 the plaintiffs, served a notice on them to vacate the land. As they did not do so, the plaintiffs instituted the present suit in 1946.

2. The suit was contested by defendant No. 1, who will be referred to hereinafter as the defendant, and his defence in substance was that the plaintiffs settled the suit land with Rachhi Singh under a deed dated the 15th Aghan 1325 fs. on an annual cash rent of Rs. 9-4-6 and it was agreed between the parties that Rachhi Singh would acquire permanent right in the land by virtue of the settlement; Rachhi Singh thereafter built a big house and dug a well on the land at a cost of about Rs. 10,000/-; the plaintiffs, therefore, are not entitled to eject the defendants. It was also pleaded that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit.

3. The learned Munsif who tried the suit held that the lease relied upon by the defendants contravened the provisions of Sec. 46 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act and was, therefore, invalid. He, however, held that as the defendants predecessor was inducted on the land on the assurance that he would have a permanent right in the land, the plaintiffs were not entitled to eject the defendants. He accordingly dismissed the suit. On the question of jurisdiction, he held that the suit was cognizable by the civil Court.

4. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the lease set up by the defendants was for an indefinite period and was, therefore, invalid in view of the provisions of Sec. 46 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act. He also held that the defendants predecessor built the house on the suit land more than 20 years ago and they have been in possession of the land and the house for up-wards of 20 years. He further held that the plaintiffs forfeited their right to eject the defendants from the land on which the house was built, but were entitled to eject them from the rest of the land. He held that the suit was cognizable by the civil Court. He accordingly allowed the appeal in part and decreed the suit with regard to the land on which no house or structure stands. On second appeal, Shearer J. affirmed the decree of the lower appellate Court.

5. The first point argued by Mr. A. B. Saran on behalf of the appellants is that the civil Court is barred under Sec.139 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act from trying the suit. But the section itself bars "suits under this Act." It has not been shown how the present suit can be said to be a suit under this Act.

6. The next point argued by Mr. Saran is that the suit is barred by limitation. According to the finding of the lower appellate Court, the defendants have been in possession under an invalid lease for more than 20 years. It is, therefore, contended that the suit is barred under Article 142 of the Limitation Act. Article 142 refers to suit

"For possession of immoveable property when the plaintiff, while in possession of the property, has been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession".

On the facts of the present case, Article 142 by its terms cannot apply. According to both parties case, the defendants predecessor was inducted on the land as a tenant, though under an invalid lease. It cannot, therefore be said that the plaintiffs have been