The special limitation provided by Article 3, Schedule III of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1938, applies only to cases of actual dispossession by the landlord or by his agents or servants, or by a third person as settlee or transferee with the active co-operation and aid of the landlord.

Narayan, J.

1. This is a defendants appeal arising out of a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession with regard to 6 bighas 1 Katha of raiyati land. This land was the property of the plaintiff, and in execution of a money decree against him an area of 7 bighas and odd, including the disputed land, was purchased by the proprietor of a concern known as Bhikhanpur and Jhapaha Concern. This sale took place on the 19th November, 1931 and it was followed by a symbolical delivery of possession which was effected sometime in the year 1932. On the 7th June, 1933, the said concern reconveyed this disputed 6 bighas 1 katha to the plaintiff by a registered sale-deed. The plaintiffs case was that in Sawan, 1349 Fasli, the defendant dispossessed him from the land on the strength of a sale-deed which had been executed in his favour by one Mr. Richardson, the managing proprietor of the Jhapaha concern, and hence be filed this present suit on the 5th April, 1945, with the prayer that his title on the strength of the sale-deed, dated the 7th June, 1933, be declared and a decree for khas possession with mesne profits be granted to him.

2. The claim was resisted by the defendant 1st party who pleaded inter alia that the suit was barred under the special limitation provided by Article 3, Schedule III of the Bihar Tenancy Act. This contention found favour with the Court of first instance which dismissed the plaintiffs claim as time-barred. On appeal by the plaintiff the decision was reversed and the learned Subordinate Judge held that, on the facts alleged, the special limitation provided by the Bihar Tenancy Act could not be applied to this case. One of the defendants 1st party then came up in second appeal and the only point that has been pressed before us is that the Court below was wrong in holding that the special limitation of the Bihar Tenancy Act, could not apply to this case. The appellants learned counsel has relied on a decision of a Single Judge of this Court in HAR DAYAL V/s. NATHUNI BHAGWAT, AIR (22) 1935 Pat 372 and has strenuously contended that this must be taken to be a case in which the landlord had a hand in the dispossession of the raiyat and that as such the claim of the plaintiff should be rejected as time-barred. But it would appear from a perusal of the Judgment of the lower appellate Court that it was never alleged in this case that the defendants had dispossessed the plaintiff at the instigation of or in collusion and concert with the landlord The learned Subordinate Judge says that there, is absolutely no suggestion in the plaint that the dispossession was caused with the collusion of the landlord and that in the evidence there is no case that the landlord helped the defendants in dispossessing the plaintiff. In my opinion this finding is conclusive of the case, and conclusive of it against this present appellant. The appellants learned counsel could not con-tend that there is any misstatement of fact in the judgment of the lower appellate Court, and the irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that the landlord had no hand in the ouster. The decision relied on by the appellants learned Counsel, apart from being a decision of a Single Judge, is really to the effect that Article 3, Schedule III, applies only to cases of actual dispossession by the landlord, and it further says that if the possession of the tenant ceases on account of the land being submerged under water, and if after re-appearance of the land there is no actual taking of possession by the raiyats and no dispossession by the landlord, then Article 3, Schedule III, would not apply. There is no doubt an observation that if a landlord authorizes a third person by making settlement of the land with him to dispossess a raiyat and that person armed with the settlement dispossesses him, the dispossession is by the landlord. In this particular case it cannot be urged that there was a settlement by the landlord and the person armed with the s