PATNA HIGH COURT
Sinha, J.
Tarak Chandra Dutta
Versus
Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb
A.F.A.P. No. 176 of 1949 ;
Decided On : APRIL 21, 1953
EJECTMENT - LEASE - PERMANENCY - ESTOPPEL - LEASE FOR BUILDING PURPOSES - CONSTRUCTION OF LEASE - RENEWAL CLAUSE - LIMITATION - ADVERSE POSSESSION - RES JUDICATA - T. P. ACT, SEC. 53-A - EVIDENCE ACT, SEC. 115.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff, the landlord, brought an action in ejectment against the defendant, who was in possession of the suit land under a kabuliyat executed by him in 1927 for a term of ten years. The defendant claimed that the lease was a permanent one and that he was entitled to remain in possession as a lessee under Sec. 53-A, T. P. Act. He also pleaded limitation, adverse possession, res judicata, and estoppel.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the lease was not a permanent one and that the defendant was not entitled to remain in possession as a lessee under Sec. 53-A, T. P. Act. It also held that the suit was not barred by limitation, adverse possession, or res judicata. The court further held that there was no estoppel against the plaintiff from taking khas possession of the suit land.
Issues: 1. Whether the lease was a permanent one? 2. Whether the defendant was entitled to remain in possession as a lessee under Sec. 53-A, T. P. Act? 3. Whether the suit was barred by limitation? 4. Whether the defendant had acquired title to the suit land by adverse possession? 5. Whether the suit was barred by res judicata? 6. Whether the plaintiff was estopped from taking khas possession of the suit land?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The lease was not a permanent one because it was for a fixed term of ten years and there was no renewal clause in the lease. 2. The defendant was not entitled to remain in possession as a lessee under Sec. 53-A, T. P. Act because the kabuliyat was a registered document and there was no defect in the instrument of transfer. 3. The suit was not barred by limitation because the defendant's possession was not adverse to the plaintiff. 4. The defendant had not acquired title to the suit land by adverse possession because he had not been in possession for 12 years. 5. The suit was not barred by res judicata because the previous suit was dismissed as premature. 6. There was no estoppel against the plaintiff from taking khas possession of the suit land because the defendant had not acted upon any representation made by the plaintiff.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Sinha, J.
1. This appeal is on behalf of the defendant arising out of an action in ejectment.
2. The plaintiffs case was that at the time of the settlement of the land in question, which measures 2 bighas 10 kathas in village Ghatsila,. he was the landlord of the land. There was a title suit going on about the proprietary interest of the plaintiff which went up to the Privy Council and was ultimately decided in favour of the plaintiff. During the pendency of that suit, a Receiver had been appointed by the Court and the Receiver settled the land with defendant 1 for a term of ten years commencing from 1334 Amli under a kabuliyat executed by defendant 1. The settlement was made on 6-5-1927. After final decision in the title suit, when the plaintiff came in khas possession of the village in which the suit land lay in July following, he brought a title suit (No. 4 of 1928) for recovery of khas possession of the land in suit on the allegation that the kabuliyat executed by the defendant was a collusive and fraudulent document and he was not bound by the same, and further that the defendant derived no title thereunder. This title suit No. 4 of 1928 was dismissed as premature, and an appeal from that decree was also dismissed. The term of the kabuliyat expired in 1344 Emli, and on 18-8-1942, about four or five years after the expiry of the term of the kabuliyat, notice to quit was served upon the defendants to vacate the land by 4-9-1942. The present suit was filed in 1945.
3. The defence was that the suit was barred by limitation; that the learned Munsif, in whose Court the suit had been filed, had no jurisdiction to try the suit and that the suit was barred by res judicata in view of the decision in title suit No. 4 of 1928. It was further alleged that the lease was a permanent one as there was a clause of renewal of the lease and the defendants had several times approached the plaintiffs manager for renewal of the lease. The notice was also challenged as not sufficient, and lastly it was urged that the defendants had spent Rs. 6000.00 on the construction of a house on the land and they could not be ejected from the land. The learned Munsif decreed the suit and the decree has been affirmed on appeal.
4. Defendant 1 has appealed to this Court, and Mr. Mitter appearing on his behalf has contended that the suit is barred under Article 144, Limitation Act because there being no valid lease, the possession of the appellant was that of a trespasser ab initio, and, therefore, he got his title perfected by continuous possession for 12 years. In my opinion, this contention is absolutely without substance. Title Suit No. 4 of 1928 had been brought immediately after the settlement with defendant 1 and it was held in that suit that the lease was a valid lease and, therefore, defendant 1 could not be ejected from the land and the house within the period covered by the lease. In that case it was also held that the settlement with the defendant accompanied by delivery of possession was a good lease and on the basis of that finding the suit had been dismissed. It cannot now be urged that the lease was ab initio void and the possession of the defendant was that of a trespasser.
5. The next point urged was that the lease was for building purposes, and, therefore, it was a permanent lease and the landlord having allowed the defendant to construct building upon the land in suit, he was estopped from challenging the permanency of the lease. Before I take up that point, I would like to dispose of some minor points taken by Mr. Mitter. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that the appellant was minor at the time of the lease, and, therefore, he was entitled to take advantage of the clause in the lease which was to his benefit, namely, that when he was given the right to build upon the land, it must be deemed that he was given a permanent lease. No question was raised about the minority of the appellant in the Court below nor was framed any issu
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