The value of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction in a partition suit is the value of the share claimed by the plaintiffs and not the value of the whole property of which partition is sought.

Ramaswami, J.

1. The question raised in this case is whether the Munsif of Raghunathpore has pecuniary jurisdiction to hear the partition suit brought by the plaintiffs.

2. The plaintiffs allege that on 27-9-1939 corresponding to 10th Aswin, 1346 Bengal Sambat, they purchased 16 gandas and odd share of defendants 1 to 4 with respect to their separate and ijmal khewats by registered sale deeds. This share corresponds to one-fourth, share of schedule 1 properties and one-sixteenth share of Schedule 2 properties as described in the plaint. The plaintiffs asked for a declaration of their title to the share claimed and for partition and separate possession of their shares in the milkiat interest. The defendants appeared before the Munsif and raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to hear the suit. It was stated on their behalf that the value of the Schedule 1 properties was Rs. 16,000 and that of Schedule 2 properties Rs. 10,000/-. Upon a consideration of the evidence adduced, the learned Munsif held that the value of Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 properties would be Rs. 20,000 and the value of the shares claimed by the plaintiffs in both the schedules would be Rs. 3,125. Accordingly the learned Munsif held that he had pecuniary jurisdiction to try the partition suit.

3. In support of this rule, Mr. Baidynath Prasad I submitted that the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to try the suit since the value of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction is not the value of the shares claimed by the plaintiffs but the value of the whole milkiat property, of which partition is sought. It was contended by the learned counsel that in a suit for partition the Court does often on the application of the defendants effect partition of the shares of the defendants amongst themselves and therefore, in such a case, the value for the purpose of jurisdiction cannot be the value of the plaintiffs share only because the Court deals with the entire estate. In support of this view, learned counsel referred to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in --Rajani Kanta Bag V/s. Rajabala Dasi, AIR 1925 Cal 320 (A), in which it was held by the Division Bench of that High Court that in a partition suit it is the entire value of the property which determines jurisdiction and not the share which the plaintiff claims in the property. I am unable, however, to accept the argument of the learned counsel for various reasons. In the first place there is a decision of our High Court in --Dukhi Singh V/s. Harihar Shah, AIR 1921 Pat 78 (B), in which it was held by Jawla Prasad and Adami, JJ. that the value of a suit for partition for the purpose of jurisdiction, is the value of the share claimed by the plaintiff and not the value of the whole property of which partition is sought.

It appears from the report that the learned Judges noticed that there was divergence of opinion on the point between the Calcutta High Court on the one hand and Bombay, Madras and Allahabad High Courts on the other. The view taken by the Calcutta High Court is reported in an earlier case --Bhagwat Sahay V/s. Pashupati Nath Bose, 10 Cal WN 564 (C). But this case was expressly dissented from by Jwala Prasad and Adami, JJ. who decided the Patna case reported in --AIR 1921 Pat 78 (B) The decision in --AIR 1925 Cal 320 (A), upon which the petitioner relies merely follows the previous decision of that High Court reported in --10 Cal WN 564 (C). I, therefore, propose to follow the Division Bench case reported in --AIR 1921 Pat 78 (B), by the authority of which we are bound. There are other important considerations which support the principle laid down in --AIR 1921 Pat 78 (B). In the first place, Section 8, Suits Valuation Act states : "Where in suits other than those referred to in the Court Fees Act, 1870, Section 7, paragraphs v, vi, and ix, and paragraph x, Clause (d), court fees are payable ad valorem under the Court-Fees Act, 1870, the value a