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1953 Supreme(Pat) 62
PATNA HIGH COURT
Banerji, Imam and Misra JJ.
Nebi Dusadh
Versus
State Of Bihar
Criminal Appeal No. 498 of 1953 ;
Decided On : APRIL 05, 1953
The testimony of a single witness, if believed, is sufficient to establish any fact, but the court should seek corroboration to fortify itself about the guilt of the accused if there is a speck of doubt in its mind relating to the testimony of that particular witness.
Headnote:
CRIMINAL APPEAL - IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED - SOLE TESTIMONY OF ONE WITNESS - CORROBORATION - TEST IDENTIFICATION PARADE - FEAR AND TERROR - CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES - SECTION 134, EVIDENCE ACT.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, Nebi Dusadh, was convicted of dacoity under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) based on the sole testimony of one witness, P.W. 1, who claimed to have identified him during the incident. The appellant challenged the conviction, arguing that the identification was unreliable due to poor lighting conditions, fear, and the possibility of mistaken identity.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the conviction was justified based on the following findings: 1. The identification by P.W. 1 was corroborated by his immediate statement to his companions and to the police after the incident, as well as by the evidence of another witness, P.W. 3, who identified the appellant in a test identification parade. 2. The lighting conditions, while not ideal, were sufficient for P.W. 1 to identify the appellant, who was known to him from before and was in close proximity during the incident. 3. The appellant's argument that P.W. 1 was terror-stricken and his senses were unreliable was rejected, as there was no evidence to suggest that he was in a state of fear that would have affected his perception. 4. The test identification parade was conducted promptly and with proper precautions to avoid collusion, and P.W. 3 successfully identified the appellant from among a large group of under-trial prisoners.
Issues: 1. Whether the identification of the appellant by P.W. 1 was reliable and sufficient to support a conviction for dacoity. 2. Whether the appellant's argument that P.W. 1 was terror-stricken and his senses were unreliable was valid.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the identification of the appellant by P.W. 1 was reliable and sufficient to support a conviction for dacoity, based on the following factors: - The identification was corroborated by P.W. 1's immediate statement to his companions and to the police after the incident, as well as by the evidence of P.W. 3, who identified the appellant in a test identification parade. - The lighting conditions, while not ideal, were sufficient for P.W. 1 to identify the appellant, who was known to him from before and was in close proximity during the incident. - The appellant's argument that P.W. 1 was terror-stricken and his senses were unreliable was rejected, as there was no evidence to suggest that he was in a state of fear that would have affected his perception. 2. The court held that the appellant's argument that P.W. 1 was terror-stricken and his senses were unreliable was not valid, as there was no evidence to suggest that he was in a state of fear that would have affected his perception.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Nebi Dusadh, for dacoity under Section 395 of the IPC.
1. This appeal has been sent to me as there has been, a difference of opinion with regard to one out of three appellants who had been convicted by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge of Purnea under Sec.395, I. P. C., and sentenced to eight years rigorous imprisonment each.
2. Briefly, the prosecution case was that certain traders were returning on bullock carts from Dhanaha Hat on 23-8-1952, when, at about 9 P. M., when the carts reached a place known as Kharra. Dhar, they were attacked by a number of persons including the appellant, Nebi Dusadh. These traders were, assaulted with lathis and were relieved of cash and bundles of cloth. It is said that Hari Ram Sao (P. W. 1) identified Nebi Dusadh and, immediately, after the miscreants had left the spot, disclosed his name to his companions.
The traders then went to a neighbouring village called Lachmipur and took shelter at the house of one Chutaharu Mandal (P. W. 9), and there also P. W. 1 reiterated that he had identified this Nebi Dusadh. Later on a fard-beyan was recorded which was treated as the first information report of this case, and in this also P. W. 1 said that he had identified Nebi Dusadh. Nebi Dusadth, with other suspects, was put on a test-identification parade, and another witness, Gulabchand (P. W, 3), identified Nebi as one of the raiders on that night. The evidence of this witness was not accepted by my learned brother Misra J., but he accepted the evidence of P. W. 1 as it was corroborated by his statement immediately after the occurrence, to his companions and to P. W. 9 and to the police afterwards.
He was inclined to rely on the sole testimony of P. W. 1 on additional grounds also, which were that he had no grudge to make any false statement against this accused and there was no possibility of obstruction to the view in that locality which was an open space. He has observed that he is not prepared to take it as a mechanical rule that in every case, even where the testimony of a prosecution witness against this accused person inspires confidence in the mind of the Court and the circumstances surrounding the matter cannot be said to be erring, his evidence must be discarded and the accused necessarily acquitted.
On the broad principle that there can be a conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of one person in a case of dacoity, my learned brother Imam J. has not differed. But he has come to the conclusion that, in the circumstances of the present case, it will be hazardous to fix the guilt on this accused as the lighting condition for proper identification of a person was neither good nor sufficient and, as P. W. 1 was passing through a mental condition caused by fear, his sense of perception cannot be implicitly relied upon. Both my learned brothers have discussed at length the observations of Bucknill J. in -- Golam Mohammad Khan V/s. Emperor, AIR 1925 Pat 536 (A) and have construed them in a way which appears to be a little opposed to each other. A number of other cases referred in the judgment of learned brother Imam J. in support of his view lay down that identification in dacoity cases should be examined with great caution; that Courts should always search for corroboration to justify the conviction of an accused on the basis of the testimony of a single person and that they have further to explore the possibility of mistake on the part of a witness when he is terror-stricken and when the visibility is poor due to lack of proper illumination.
3. On the broad principle, whether it is either legal or proper to case a conviction on the sole testimony of one witness, there appears to be no difference. Indeed, the rule of law has been expressed in Sec.134, Evidence Act which says that no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof of any fact. The result is that in any case the testimony of a single witness", if believed, is sufficient to establish any fact. The section merely follows the maxim that evidence is
