The period of limitation for execution of a decree runs from the date of the final decree or order of the appellate court, or the withdrawal of the appeal, where there has been an appeal.

Imam, J.

1. The only question for determination in this appeal is as to whether the application for execution of the decree in partition suit No. 36 of 1945 D/- 29-1-1047 was barred by time. Against the decree in the aforesaid partition suit an appeal had been filed to this court which was admitted and registered as First Appeal No. 162 of 1947. On 20-10-1948 a Bench of this court gave to the appellants in first Appeal No. 162 of 1947 six weeks time to deposit the printing cost, failing which the appeal would stand dismissed without further reference to the Bench. The order of the Bench not having been complied with the appeal stood dismissed.

The application for execution of the decree was filed on 12-4-1950 which was certainly more than three years from 29-1-1947, the date of the decree. It was, however, within three years from the order of this court. There is no dispute between the parties that if the period of limitation is counted from the order of this court, then the application for execution was within time. If, on the other hand, the period of limitation was to be counted from the date of the decree, then the application for execution was out of time.

2. The provision of the Limitation Act which governs the matter is Article 182(2) of that Act. It provides a period of three years for the execution of a decree or order of a Civil Court not provided for by Article 183 of the Act or by Sec. 48, of Civil P.C., from the date of the final decree or order of the appellate court, or the withdrawal of the appeal, where there has been an appeal. There can be no question in -my judgment that when the appeal was admitted by this court and registered as First Appeal No. 162 of 1947 there had been an appeal against the decree of the Court of the first instance. We may take it as a fact that actually no decree was prepared by this Court in pursuance of the peremptory order concerning the deposit of printing cost resulting in the dismissal of the appeal.

What has to be decided is as to whether there is an order of the appellate Court and whether time should be calculated from the date of that order. As I have said, First Appeal No. 162 of 1947 was admitted and registered, and it has been dismissed. It certainly was not dismissed automatically under any rule of the court; nor was it dismissed by any order of the Registrar, as it could not be. The appeal clearly stood dismissed as the result of an order of this Court.

In construing the provisions of a statute it is the bounden duty of the court to give the ordinary and the plain meaning to the words used in the statute. The words of the Limitation Act as contained in Article 182(2) arc plain enough, and there is no ambiguity about them. There was, undoubtedly, an order of this court directing the dismissal of the appeal if the appellants did not carry out the direction of the court. In the case of --Nagendra Nath V/s. Suresh Chandra, AIR 1932 PC 165 (A), the Privy Council considered the provisions of Article 182(2), Limitation Act, and Sir Dinshah Mulla delivering the judgment of the Privy Council made the following observation: "Their Lordships think that nothing would be gained by discussing these varying authorities in detail. They think that the question must be decided upon the plain words of the article: where there has been an appeal, time is to run from the date of the decree of the Appellate Court. There is, in their Lordships opinion, no warrant for reading into the words quoted any qualification either as to the character of the appeal or as to the parties to it; the Words mean just what they say. The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is, their Lordships think, the only safe guide. It is at least an intelligible rule that so long as there is any question sub-judice