Back
PATNA HIGH COURT
V.Ramaswami and Raj Kishore Prasad JJ.
Ramnath Prasad
Versus
State Transport Appellate Authority
Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 186 of 1956 ;
Decided On : AUGUST 07, 1956
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - SECTION 64 - APPEAL - LIMITATION - CONDONATION OF DELAY - JURISDICTION OF APPEAL BOARD - REVIEW OF ORDER - POWER OF R.T.A. - GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, SECTION 21 - APPLICABILITY.
Fact of the Case:
Petitioner and opposite party No. 2 applied for a stage carriage permit for the Purnea-Kishunganj route. Both were granted permits by the R.T.A. One Suraj Narain Mitra appealed to the Appeal Board, which directed one of the two permits to be granted to Mitra and remanded the matter to the R.T.A. to decide which of the petitioner and opposite party No. 2 should get the second permit. The R.T.A. allowed the permit of the petitioner to stand and cancelled the permit of opposite party No. 2. Opposite party No. 2 filed an application for review of the R.T.A.'s order, which was rejected. He then filed an appeal to the Appeal Board, which admitted the appeal despite the objection of the R.T.A. that no appeal lay. The Appeal Board set aside the R.T.A.'s order granting the permit to the petitioner. The petitioner moved the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, which quashed the Appeal Board's order and directed it to hear the appeal again on merits. The Appeal Board heard the parties and passed an order reversing the R.T.A.'s order and allowing the appeal of opposite party No. 2. The petitioner again moved the High Court under Articles 226 and 227, seeking a writ to quash the Appeal Board's order.
Finding of the Court:
1. The R.T.A. has no power to review its order under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or the rules framed under it, and therefore, there is no appeal to the Appeal Board against an order passed by the R.T.A. rejecting an application for review. 2. The Appeal Board had no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the appeal beyond the period of limitation prescribed by Rule 71 of the rules framed under Section 68 of the Act. 3. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 does not apply to the present case as there was no existing order on which it could operate.
Issues: 1. Whether the R.T.A. has the power to review its order under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or the rules framed under it? 2. Whether there is an appeal to the Appeal Board against an order passed by the R.T.A. rejecting an application for review? 3. Whether the Appeal Board has the jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the appeal beyond the period of limitation prescribed by Rule 71 of the rules framed under Section 68 of the Act? 4. Whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applies to the present case?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or the rules framed under it do not provide for a review of its order by the R.T.A. or even by the Appeal Board. 2. A power of review is not inherent in any authority apart from the statute except to correct its own mistake. 3. The Appeal Board has no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing an appeal under Section 64 of the Act beyond the statutory period of thirty days as provided by Rule 71. 4. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which empowers a Court to admit an appeal after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, does not apply to the Act, and, as such Sec. 5 will not apply to an appeal filed under Sec. 64 of the Act. 5. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 does not speak of any order, but of the power to "grant" a permit, and therefore, there is no question of varying, or rescinding, or amending any order.
Final Decision: The High Court allowed the petition, made the rule absolute, and issued a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Appeal Board dated 3rd March, 1956.
Raj Kishore Prasad, J.
1. In this case a rule has been obtained, from the High Court, by the petitioner on an application under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against the opposite party to show cause why a writ, in the nature of certiorari, would not be issued quashing the order, of the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority dated 3-3-1956, passed on an appeal Abdul Majid Khan, opposite party No. 2. The Advocate-General has shown cause against the rule on behalf of, the opposite party but no counter-affidavit has been filed on their behalf.
2. The petitioner applied for a stage carriage permit under Sec. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Act IV of 1939), hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for the Purnea-Kishunganj route. On 26-9-1950, Abdul Majid Khan, opposite party No. 2 also applied for a similar permit for the same route. On 29-5-1951, the East Bihar Regional Transport Authority hereinafter mentioned as "R.T.A." granted stage carriage permits to both the petitioner and opposite party No. 2 for the Purnea-Kishunganj route.
One Suraj Narain Mitra, who was also one of the applicants for a similar permit for the same route, being aggrieved by the above order of the R.T.A. preferred an appeal, under Sec. 64(a) of the Act. to the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority hereinafter mentioned as the "Appeal Board". On 7-1-1953, the Appeal Board directed one of the two permits to be granted to the appel-lants Suraj Narain Mitra, and remanded the matter to the R.T.A. for deciding which of the two persons, namely the petitioner arid opposite party No. 2 should get the second permit. The peti-titioner on notice by the R.T.A. appeared but opposite party no. 2 did not appear before the R.T.A. The R. T. A. therefore on 26-2-1953, allowed the permit of the petitioner to stand and cancelled the permit of the opposite party No. 2 and directed him to surrender his permit.
3. On 17-3-1953, opposite party No. 2 filed an application for review of the above order of R.T.A. passed in his absence on the ground that he had not been served with any notice of the hearing of the matter before the R.T.A. In the said application he also prayed for stay of the operation of the order of the R.T.A. dated 26-2-1953, asking opposite party No. 2 to surrender his permit. On 29-3-1953, the R.T.A. admitted this application of opposite party No. 2 and stayed the operation of its order dated 26-2. 1953, and asked for a report from the Secretary, R.T.A. regarding the complaint of opposite party No. 2 about the non-receipt of the notice pf the hearing of the case before the R.T.A. by opposite party No. 2. On 25-4-1953, the R.T.A. found after receipt of the report of the Secretary, that notice had been served on opposite party No. 2 and, therefore, rejected the application for review filed by opposite party No. 2 and vacated the order of stay.
4. On 25-5-1953, opposite party No. 2 filed an appeal against the above order of the R.T.A. dated 25-4-1953. To the said petition of appeal presented by opposite party No. 2, is annexed A of the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner. On 6-7-1953, the appeal of opposite party No. 2 was admitted in spite of the objection of the Secretary R.T.A. that no appeal lay, because no appeal was provided against an order rejecting a review application. On 3-12-1953, the petitioner received a telegram from the Appeal Board to appear before it on 5-12-1953, at the time of the hearing of the appeal flled by opposite party No. 2 but the petitioner did not appear on the said date, because, according to him, he had no information of this appeal earlier. The Appeal Board, therefore, on 5-12-1953, passed an order, in the absence of the petitioner, setting aside the order of the R.T.A. granting permit to the petitioner. The petitioner, thereafter, moved the State Government under Section 64(a) of the Act, but the petitioners application for revision was rejected with the direction that, in view
An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers
Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance
Scan Me!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :
Back to top
