A person who enters into possession of land under a void lease and remains in possession for the full statutory period acquires the right of a lessee by prescription, but cannot acquire a higher right than the right which the instrument of lease purported to convey to him.

Kanhaiya Singh, J.

1. This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge of Gaya dated the 18th January, 1950, affirming the decision of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Gaya dated 20th January, 1949, under which the suit of the plaintiff-respondent for possession was decreed. The plaintiff in this case is the Gaya District Board, and the suit relates to 13 bighas of land in village Shamser Nagar in the district of Gaya. The Chairman of the District Board settled this land with the defendant at an annual rental of Rs. 195/- in the first instance for five years with effect from 1-7-33 and again on the expiry of the first term for another period of five years with effect from 1-4-1939, on each occasion by a registered deed of lease dated, respectively, 3-11-34 and 5-12-40.

On the expiry of the term of the second lease on 31-3-44 the plaintiff, it was alleged, entered into possession and remained in possession from 31-3-44 to 12-4-44 when the land was settled with one Chetawan Pandey by auction for five years with effect from 13-4-44 at an annual rental of Rs. 221/-. A dispute about possession arose between Chetawan Pandey and the defendant culminating in a proceeding under Sec.144 of the Criminal Procedure Code which eventually terminated in favour of the defendant. Thereupon, the plaintiff brought the suit on 7-12-46 for possession with mense profits substantially on the grounds that this land formed part of the road known as Baroon Bhaneria Inglish Road, the part of the road comprising the suit land being commonly called side cutting lands meant For the repair of the road and its flanks, that the settlement with the defendant was purely for a temporary period, that the settlement was invalid because the Chairman had no authority to make the settlement and the deed of lease was not executed in accordance with law, that the defendant was & mere licensee and that he had no right to remain on the land and was liable to be ejected.

2. The defendant admitted the two settlements alleged by the plaintiff, but opposed the plaintiffs suit on two main grounds: first, that he was the settled raiyat of the village and had acquired rights of occupancy in the suit land, and, secondly, that even if the settlements be taken to be invalid as being unauthorised he had acquired occupancy right by prescription by virtue of his adverse possession for more than twelve years. It was denied that the disputed land formed part of the side cutting lands appertaining to the Baroon Bhaneria Inglish Road. It was alleged that it was an agricultural land meant for the purposes of cultivation.

3. Both the Courts concurrently found that the leases in favour of the defendant were invalid and void for lack of authority in the Chairman and conferred no title on the defendant. They held further that the defendant was continuously in possession of the disputed land since after the first settlement, that is to say, since after 1-7-33, but this possession was not sufficient to sustain the defence of acquisition of occupancy rights, as his possession was not as a raiyat but as a mere licensee. They accordingly decreed the plaintiffs suit. The defendant has come up in Second Appeal.

4. On behalf of the appellant the learned Government Advocate contended that on the findings of the Court below the plaintiff should have been unsuited. The argument put forward by him is that if the leases were invalid, the possession of the defendant was as a trespasser, and as he had been in possession of the disputed land continuously for more than twelve years, he had acquired rights of occupancy in the suit land by prescription.

5. So far as the invalidity of the leases is concerned, the learned Government Advocate did not seriously dispute the findings of the Court below. The District Board is a body corporate and, therefore, all transactions entered into by the Board must of necessity be in accordance with the provisions of the law, and the rul