1957 Supreme(Pat) 58
PATNA HIGH COURT
Sinha and K.Dayal JJ.
Ramkeshwar Prasad
Versus
Babu Girja Prasad
Appeal From Original Order No. 345 of 1952 ;
Decided On : FEBRUARY 22, 1957
An order for payment of the commissioner's fee is executable as a decree under Section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Headnote:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 - SECTIONS 36, 38, 47 - EXECUTION OF ORDER - ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF COMMISSIONER'S FEE - EXECUTABLE AS DECREE - APPEAL - NOT MAINTAINABLE.
Fact of the Case:
Appellants filed an application under Sections 47 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking amendment of an executable order passed in favor of the pleader commissioner. The order directed the appellants to pay the commissioner's fee, and upon their failure to do so, the commissioner took out execution. The appellants objected to the executability of the order, arguing that the commissioner should have instituted a suit for payment.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the order for payment of the commissioner's fee was executable as a decree under Section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 38 provides that the provisions relating to the execution of decrees apply to the execution of orders. The court further held that the appellants' objection to the execution of the order was not a question relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree, and therefore, no appeal lay under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Issues: 1. Whether the order for payment of the commissioner's fee was executable as a decree? 2. Whether the appellants' objection to the execution of the order was a question relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the execution of orders. An order is defined as the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree. The order for payment of the commissioner's fee fell within this definition and was therefore executable as a decree. 2. The appellants' objection to the execution of the order was not a question relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree. It was an objection to the amount mentioned in the order. Such an objection was not covered by the provisions of Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal with costs, holding that it was without merit.
Sinha, J.
1. This is an appeal by defendants 10 to 16 to a partition suit against an order dismissing their application for amendment of the executable order passed in favour of the pleader commissioner.
2. In a suit for partition, a preliminary decree was passed, and, after the preliminary decree, a pleader commissioner was appointed to make takhta-bandi. It appears, after the takhtabandi had been made, the appellants filed certain objections to the report of the pleader commissioner, and, thereupon, the Court ordered reshuffling of the allotment, but directed that the cost of the same will be entirely borne by these appellants. After that, the appellants were directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 1,200.00 as commissioners fee.
They deposited Rs. 1,200/-; but as the final bill of the commissioner was passed for Rs. 2,187/-, the Court, by order dated 28th March, 1947, directed the appellants to deposit the balance, namely, Rs. 987/-. The report of the pleader commissioner was confirmed on 30th June, 1947. It appears, the pleader commissioner submitted another bill for Rs, 200/-, and a third one for Rs. 32/-. On 26th September, 1947, the Court consolidated all the pending bills of the commissioner, according to which these appellants had to pay a sum of Rs. 1,219/-, and the Court passed the bill of the commissioner for Rs. 1,219/-, and directed that the defendants 10 to 16 should pay the amount within a month from that date, failing which the pleader commissioner was to realise the amount by execution together with future interest at 6 per cent, per annum from the date of the order, namely, 26th September, 1947. The money not having been paid, the pleader commissioner took out execution sometime in the year 1949. Thereafter, these appellants filed an application on 20th December, 1950, which was headed as being one under Sections 47 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with a prayer which I would like to quote: "Therefore the petitioners request your honour to order the amendment of the executable order in favour of the learned Commissioner B. Girja Pd. and hope that your honour will kindly do so for which the humble petitioners shall ever pray."
The objection, therefore, per se, is not an objection to the executability of the order but to the amount mentioned in the order. This objection was heard and decided against the appellants on 25th August, 1952, and hence this appeal.
3. Mr. Saran, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, has raised a preliminary objection that no appeal lies to this Court. Mr. Chaudhary, on behalf of the appellants, has submitted that appeal lies under Sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He further submits that the order pass ed by the Court below on 26th September, 1947 was an order which could not have been executed in law; and that, if the pleader commissioner wanted payment of the money, as mentioned in that order, he should have instituted a suit.
4. I think, the preliminary objection is not without substance. Appeal can possibly lie only under Sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if that section has any application. It is, however, obvious that Sec. 47 has application only where questions arise between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives, and relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. In this case the pleader commissioner was not a party to the suit, and the questions raised are not questions in regard to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, Sec. 47 has no application.
The answer given by Mr. Chaudhary is that Sec. 47 was the section mentioned under which the appellants had filed the objection. There is no doubt that Section 47 is mentioned as one of the sections under which the application was made; but merely because of that label, no legal significance can possibly be attached to that petition as a petition under Sec. 47. This is apparent also f