The doctrine of lis pendens applies to court sales, including execution sales, and prevents the alienation of property that is the subject matter of a pending suit, so as to affect the rights of any other party to the suit under any decree or order that may be made therein.

Raj Kishore Prasad, J.

1. On this appeal, by the plaintiffs against the concurrent decisions of the courts below dismissing their suit, the only question presented for determination in support of the appeal is : Whether the purchase of the lands in dispute by defendants second party in a rent execution is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens because of a title suit in respect of these very lands brought by the plaintiffs against the defendants second party which was then pending, but was subsequently decreed?

2. This question of lis pendens was not raised in any of the courts below, but as it was a pure question of law, Mr. A. B. N. Sinha, who appeared for the appellants, Was permitted to raise it at the second appellate stage in this Court, as it did not require investigation, of any question of fact, and, as it arose on the facts as found by the courts below. This case is a very clear and simple one when once the various proceedings and dates are ascertained.

3. In order to appreciate this point, however, it is necessary to know a few facts bearing on this question:

4. Mahadeo Singh, the recorded tenant of the land in dispute, which is khata No. 40, having an area of 3.75 acres, in village Naubant, mentioned in Schedule A of the plaint, on the 31st August 1936, made a gift of all his properties, including the suit lands, to plaintiff no. 1. Thereafter, on the 3rd October, 1936, Mahadeo Singh executed a sale deed in respect of the suit lands in favour of the defendants second party, but it was not given effect to for want of consideration.

This, however, led to a dispute between the plaintiff, -- plaintiff 2 is the son of plaintiff 1- and the defendants second party, with the result that ultimately the plaintiffs in 1941 instituted a title suit-Title Suit No. 165 of 1941 / 113 of 1943 in respect of the suit lands against the defendants second party for declaration of their title to and recovery of possession of the same. Earlier in 1940, however, the defendants second party got a rent suit-Rent Suit No. 990 of 1940-instituted against Mt. Sona Kuer in respect of the disputed lands. It may be stated here that Mahadeo Singh had no son. On the findings, he had two daughters, namely, Mt. Rajo Kuer, wife of plaintiff 1 and mother of plaintiff 2, and, Mt. Sona Kuer, but Rajo Kuer, died in the life time of Mahadeo Singh, whereas Mt. Sona Kuer was alive at the date of the rent suit. Defendant 2, subsequently, intervened in the rent suit, but Mt. Sona Kuer did not appear in the suit. The rent suit was ultimately decreed on the 22nd May, 1941, against the defendants second party. Defendant 2 and the other defendants, constituting the defendants second party, are members of a joint Mistakshara family, and, defendant 2 is its Karta.

In execution of this decree for arrears of rent in respect of the suit land, it was sold on the 21st July, 1942 and purchased by the defendants second party in the name of defendant 1, who is the sole defendant first party. On the 4th October, 1942, delivery of possession was given to the auction purchaser. Thereafter, the title suit was also decreed against the defendants second party and in favour of the plaintiffs, and, in execution of their decree, the plaintiffs on the 15th July, 1945, got delivery of possession over the suit land against the defendants second party. Thereafter, the plaintiffs settled the lands in suit with defendants 7 and 8 who are defendants third party in the suit.

5. On the above admitted facts, the question arises as to whether the purchase of the defendants second party in execution of a decree for arrears of rent passed in a rent suit brought earlier was affected by lis pendens in view of the subsequent title suit brought by the plaintiffs against the defendants second party in respect of the suit lands which was admittedly instituted before the execution sale, but was decreed thereafter.

6. It is clear from the above facts that the plaintiffs were claiming title to the suit