In suits for declaration with consequential relief under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act, the plaintiff can put his own valuation on the relief sought, and the court can intervene only if the valuation put by the plaintiff is arbitrary.

C.P.Sinha, J.

1. These three applications have been filed by the defendants in the three suits giving rise to these applications. The point that falls to be decided in these cases is as to whether the court-fee paid is sufficient or not.

2. In 1945, certain land acquisition proceedings were started for acquisition of lands in Sindri. There was a notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, which was followed by one under Sec. 6 of the Act, and some buildings started to be constructed on these lands. In January, 1951, there was another notification under Sec. 6 of the Act regarding portions of the lands which had formed subject-matter of the previous acquisition and some other lands also. An award was made in each case under Sections 11 and 12 of the Land Acquisition Act. In the suit giving rise to Civil Revision No. 384, the award of the Land Acquisition Officer amounted to Rs. 474/6/-; in the suit giving rise to Civil Revision No. 385, the award was for Rs. 284/10/-; and in the suit out of which Civil Revision No. 386 arises, the award was to the extent of Rs. 1,107/13/3. Thereafter, there were applications under Sec.18 of the Land Acquisition Act for reference to the District Judge, and the plaintiffs of these suits claimed compensation for the lands and buildings existing on the lands. After that, the plaintiffs have instituted these suits giving rise to these applications, and the important reliefs sought in the plaints are the following :

(a) for a declaration that the land acquisition case in question was wholly void; and

(b) for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants their agents and servants from taking possession of the properties described in Schedules A and B of the plaints and from demolishing the structures in Schedule B.

In each case, the- suit has been valued at the amount of the compensation awarded in the land acquisition proceeding. In the body of the plaint in each case, it is mentioned that the plaintiff had built the structures on the land before the acquisition, and the value of those buildings has been mentioned. The defendants contended before the Court below, as they contend here, that the value of the suits should be the value of the buildings and the lands mentioned in the plaints, and that the amount of the awards in the land acquisition proceedings is not the proper value of the suits. The Court below has held that the plaint in each case is properly valued and the court-fee paid is sufficient. It is against this order that the defendants have moved this Court.

3. Learned Government Pleader, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submits that all these three suits are governed by the provisions of Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act, and ad valorem court-fee has got to be paid. So far there is no difficulty. Mr. Government Pleader also submits that the plaintiff in each case must value the suit on the amount mentioned in each plaint in regard to the value of the lands including the buildings. The relevant portion of Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act is as follows :

"(iv) In suits -- * * * * *

(c) to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed, * * * * *

according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal

****

It is established that, under the provisions of this section a plaintiff is entitled to put his own valuation, but the Court can interfere only if the valuation put by the plaintiff is an arbitrary one, and in such case the Court can put its own valuation and ask the plaintiff to pay court-fee upon that valuation. So the test in all cases covered by Section 7 (iv) (c) is whether the valuation put by the plaintiff is an. arbitrary or unreasonable one; in other words, whether the valuation put by the plaintiff can be said to have no relation to facts.

In the present case, the main relief for declaration in each case is that the land acquisition proceeding is null and void, and