The interpretation of Section 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, which provides for statutory settlement of bakasht land in khas possession of an intermediary on the date of vesting of the estate, does not include actual physical possession but also includes constructive possession and a mere right to possess.

Kanhaiya Singh, J.

1. This Second Appeal by defendant 1 is from the concurrent decisions of the Courts below given in a suit instituted by the plaintiffs respondents for a declaration of title to and recovery of possession of 4 bighas 12 kathas and odd lands comprised in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of the plaint. The plaintiffs case was that plaintiffs 1 to 3 were the proprietors of the disputed lands, the lands mentioned in Schedule 1 constituting their zirat lands, those in Schedule 2 their bakasht lands and those in Schedule 3 their raiyati lands and that plaintiffs 4 and 5 were their tenants and were in possession of Schedule 3 lands as jagirdar and bataidar, respectively.

The plaintiffs asserted their title and continuous possession over the disputed lands. In 1946, there was in that part a great social upheaval due to the activities of the socialist movement. Mahabir Pandey (defendant 1), the appellant, started creating troubles so much so that be aided by his followers forcibly cut and removed the crop grown by the plaintiffs. This led to a serious apprehension of the breach of the peace, and Mr. T.D. Mehta, Deputy Magistrate, was deputed to restore law and order and maintain peace.

Mr. Mehta just to restore peace coerced plaintiffs 1 to 3 to agree to a division of the paddy bundles between themselves and the appellant and at the instance of and under undue influence of Mr. Mehta, plaintiff 2 granted a receipt in favour of the appellant on 26-12-1947. On the strength of this receipt the appellant filed an application under Sec. 40 of the Bihar Tenancy Act for commutation of the produce rent. This application was dismissed on 10-5-1949. The appellant persisted in putting pressure upon the plaintiffs and got a proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure started against the plaintiffs. This proceeding was ultimately converted into a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code in which all the lands in suit were attached. This case was fought up to the High Court, but after remand from the High Court, this proceeding was decided against the plaintiffs on 29-6-1951. The plaintiffs alleged that being emboldened by the adverse decision in the proceeding under Sec.145 the appellant dispossessed them of the suit land on 30-6-1951. The plaintiffs thereafter commenced the present action on 29-9-1951 for the reliefs indicated above.

2. The appellant resisted the plaintiffs suit for possession. He claimed tenancy right in the suit lands. His defence was that in Jeth 1335 fasli, Bishun Singh, father of plaintiffs 1 to 3 settled with him the disputed lands along with other lands measuring in all 6 bighas 17 kathas 10 dhurs and that since the settlement he has been in continuous possession of the same. He raised the plea that as he was a settled raiyat of the village he had acquired occupancy right in the settled lands. He refuted the allegation of coercion on the part of Mr. Mehta and alleged that due to agrarian troubles Mr. Mehta took a proceeding under section 69 of the Bihar Tenancy Act and got the paddy divided and also had a receipt granted by Kailash Singh (Plaintiff 2).

3. During the pendency of this appeal the State of Bihar was also impleaded as a party under Sec. 4 (ee) of the Land Reforms Act.

4. Both the Courts concurrently held that the plaintiffs had title to the disputed lands and also possession within twelve years of the suit and that the stoiy of settlement made by the appellant was untrue. Accordingly they entered judgment in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit.

5. Mr. Jaleshwar Prasad appearing for the appellant first contended that the finding of the Courts below about possession of the plaintiffs was vitiated by the fact that there was no proper consideration of the evidence on the record. He particularly laid great stress upon the receipt, exhibit 5 (a), and contended that this was wrongly rejected by the Courts below. His submission is that this receipt established both the title and possess