A restriction on the right to trade and business under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution must be reasonable and must provide for an appellate authority or judicial review of the orders passed by the administrative authority.

R.K.Choudhary, J.

1. These two applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India have been made by one Jugal Kishore Bhadani, proprietor of Messrs Ramlal Jugal Kishore of Purani-Godown in the town of Gaya, and arise out of two orders of the Labour Commissioner of Bihar, respondent No. 1, one dated 21-1-1956, passed in favour of Basudev Prasad, respondent No. 4 in M. J. C. No. 473 of 1956, and the other dated 27-1-1956, passed in favour of Chhotan Prasad Singh, respondent No. 4 in M. J. C. No. 474 of 1956, under Sec.26 (2) of the .Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953 (Bihar Act VIII of 1954), hereinafter to be referred to as the Act, read with Rule 21 of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Rules, 1955, framed under Sec. 40 of the Act, hereinafter to be referred to as the rules.

2. The short facts are these: The above named Basudeo Prasad and Chhotan Prasad Singh were employees in the firm of the petitioner and had served therein for several years. On 15-3-1955, Chhotan Prasad Singh was discharged from his employment and on 19-3-1955, Basudeo Prasad was discharged from the service. They thereafter preferred appeals before the Labour Commissioner, Bihar, under Sec.26 (2) of the Act, and the Labour Commissioner held that the discharge orders of both these persons were illegal, and the orders of discharge were, therefore, set aside.

The reasons for taking the above view were that no notice was served on the two employees and they were not guilty of any misconduct as alleged by the employer. The Labour Commissioner, however, considered that the relationship between the employer and the employees had so deteriorated that no useful purpose would be served if they are reinstated. He, therefore, instead of passing an order for reinstatement, made an order that the employer should pay to each of them Rs. 500 as compensation.

Thereafter, in the case of Basudeo Prasad, respondent No. 3, S.A. Rahman, Magistrate, first class, Gaya, being directed by respondent No. 2, the District Magistrate, Gaya, realised the amount of Rs. 500 from the petitioner by issue of a distress warrant, but the payment of the money to the employee has been stayed, and in the case of Chhotan Prasad Singh, the same Magistrate, as directed by the District Magistrate, Gaya, took steps to realise the amount from the petitioner by issue of a distress warrant. In these circumstances, the proprietor, Sri Jugal Kishore Bhadani, made the two applications in this Court.

3. Cause has been shown by the above two employees by filing counter-affidavits in both the cases and they have contested the applications. A contest is also made by the learned Government Pleader on behalf of respondents 1 to 3.

4. Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh appearing for the petitioner in both the cases has contended that the order passed by the appellate authority, namely, the Labour Commissioner, Bihar, is not contemplated by the Act, and, therefore, is illegal. Sec.26 (2) of the Act lays down that every such employee shall have a right of appeal to such authority and within such time as may be prescribed either on the ground that (1) there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services, or (2) no notice was served on him as required by Sub-section (1), or (3) he had not been guilty of any misconduct as held by the employer. As to what would be the nature of the order that the appellate authority will pass on such appeal, is not given in the Act. It has, therefore, been contended by Mr. Singh that the appellate authority had no power to award any compensation. His contention is that the authority being of limited jurisdiction, it could not impose pecuniary liability on a citizen unless it was expressly authorised to do so and he has put forward an argument that what the law required him to do was only to pass orders with respect to the grounds on which the appeal lay as mentioned in Sec.26 (2) of the Act. I am unable to accept this contention.

The grounds given in the