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1958 Supreme(Pat) 55

PATNA HIGH COURT
Kanhaiya Singh, J.
Jangi Gope
Versus
State Through Ramsakal Singh
Criminal Revision No. 768 of 1957 ;
Decided On : MARCH 18, 1958

The court emphasized the importance of considering the cases of individual petitioners separately in proceedings under Section 107 Cr. P.C. and held that an order that fails to do so cannot be sustained.

Headnote:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1898 - SECTION 107, 117, 118 - ORDER UNDER SECTION 118 - VAGUENESS - EXPIRATION OF PERIOD - CONSIDERATION OF INDIVIDUAL CASES - INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioners challenged the order of the Magistrate and the appellate Court directing them to execute bonds for keeping the peace under Section 118 Cr. P.C. They argued that the order was vague as it did not specify the date for furnishing the security bonds, that it had become nugatory due to the expiration of the four-month period, and that the cases of individual petitioners were not considered separately.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the omission to specify the date for furnishing the security bonds was an irregularity that could be cured by fixing a date. It rejected the argument that the order had become nugatory due to the expiration of the period, as it would allow persons bent on disturbing the peace to render the proceedings infructuous by delaying tactics. However, the court found that the cases of individual petitioners were not considered separately, which was a fatal flaw in the proceedings.

Issues: 1. Whether the order under Section 118 Cr. P.C. was vague due to the absence of a specified date for furnishing security bonds? 2. Whether the order had become nugatory due to the expiration of the four-month period? 3. Whether the cases of individual petitioners were considered separately?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the omission to specify the date for furnishing the security bonds was an irregularity that could be cured by fixing a date. It reasoned that such an omission should not vitiate the entire order, as it would allow persons bent on disturbing the peace to render the proceedings infructuous by delaying tactics. 2. The court rejected the argument that the order had become nugatory due to the expiration of the period, as it would allow persons bent on disturbing the peace to render the proceedings infructuous by delaying tactics. It held that the proper course in such cases is to make the period during which the petitioners were to keep the peace or maintain good behavior operative from the date fixed by the appellate or revisional authority. 3. The court found that the cases of individual petitioners were not considered separately, which was a fatal flaw in the proceedings. It held that the Magistrate and the appellate Court should have dealt with the cases of individual petitioners separately and summarized the evidence against each.

Final Decision: The court allowed the application, set aside the order of the Magistrate dated 20-3-56, and quashed the proceedings. It directed the Magistrate to initiate fresh proceedings under Section 107 Cr. P.C. if he considered that the danger of the breach of the peace continued and the petitioners were likely to commit such acts.

Judgment

Kanhaiya Singh, J.

1. This revisional application is against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge dated 8-7-57 affirming in appeal, the order of the Magistrate dated 20-3-56 directing the petitioners under Sec.118 Cr. P.C. to execute bonds of Rs. 500 each with two sureties of like amount for keeping the peace for four months or, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for the same period.

2. In support of this application Mr. Akbar Imam contended that the order of the learned Magistrate as wall as the order of the appellate Court was vague, inasmuch as, they did not specify the date by which the security bonds were to be furnished. It is true that no date was fixed for the furnishing of the security bonds, and it is unfortunate that the appellate Court also missed this point This omission, however, does not vitiate the entire order, and the irregularity may be cured by fixing a date by which the security bonds should be furnished. This contention, therefore, does not advance the petitioners case.

3. It was next contended by him that the order of the Magistrate has become nugatory by efflux of time, inasmuch as, the period of four months during which petitioners were directed to keep the peace had already expired. In support of this contention reliance was placed upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Babu Ram V/s. Rex, AIR 1949 All 21. In that case Agarwala J., sitting singly, observed as follows :

"So far as the present case, however, is concerned one fact is quite clear and in my opinion, a decisive of the case. The initial orders made on 18th August 1947, required the parties concerned to furnish securities for a period of three months commencing from 18th August 1947. That period has long expired, and even if the learned Magistrate were now to hear the case upon the merits under Sec.117, Criminal P. C., he would not be in a position to pass a final order in confirmation of his previous order and he would have to drop the proceedings. In the circumstances, the only proper order that can now be passed by me is to quash the original orders of the learned Magistrate dated 18-8-1947. I, therefore, accept these references and quash the orders passed by the learned City Magistrate on 18th August 1947, against the second party. It will be open, however, to the learned City Magistrate to initiate fresh proceedings under Sec.107, Criminal P.C., if it may at any time appear to him that there is a danger of the breach of peace".

With great respect I differ from the view taken by the learned Judge. If that were the correct position in few, then in all cases where because of long pendency of any appeal or revision the period initially fixed by the Magistrate for keeping the peace had expired, the proceeding taken under Sec.107 Cr. P. C. will automatically fail. In most cases it will be difficult to dispose of an appeal from the order under Sec.118 Cr. P. C. and revision, if any from the appellate order, during the period fixed by the Magistrate for keeping the peace. If that were so, it will be easy for the persons bent upon disturbing the peace to destroy the effect of such proceeding by adoption of delaying tactics. The entire argument is fallacious and /unreasonable to the extreme in that the very act of the persons bent upon committing the breach of the peace is used in their favour as a ground for quashing the entire proceeding. It is difficult to countenance such a course of conduct. If it were so, no proceeding under Section 107 will have a successful termination, because by causing deliberate delay and by taking an appeal from the order and hampering its expeditious disposal on some frivolous grounds or other the order of the Magistrate may be rendered easily infructuous, because of the expiration in the meantime of the period for keeping the peace or maintaining good behaviour, as the case may be, before the disposal of the connected appear or the revision. This contention is therefore supportable neith


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