The claimants failed to establish their claim to the attached properties and the attachment continued in force despite the acquittal of the accused.

Kanhaiya Singh, J.

1. Pursuant to the provisions of Ordinance No. XXXVIII of 1944 certain properties were attached on the allegations that they belonged to Ragho Prasad who was an accused for the commission of an offence, which is admittedly a scheduled offence, that is to say, an offence mentioned in the schedule to the said Ordinance. If these two appeals certain landed property, a house-standing sthereon and a press installed therein are in question. The land and the house are claimed by Sonamati Devi, the wife of Mahabir Prasad. Sonamati is the appellant in Miscellaneous Appeal No.. 170 of 1955. The press installed therein is, however, claimed by her husband Mahabir, who is the appellant in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 171 of 1955. This Mahabir is the brother of Ragho, the accused. After the attachment, both Mahabir and his wife-preferred a claim to the properties, as provided in Sec. 4 of the said Ordinance, and their claim was investigated by the District Judge, as provided in Sec. 5 of the Ordinance.

After hearing the parties, the learned District Judge held that the aforesaid properties belonged to Ragho and they were mere name-lenders. He accordingly dismissed their claim, and now they have preferred separate appeals against the decision of the learned District Judge.

2. These two appeals were heard analogously, and this judgment will govern both.

3. The learned counsel for the appellants raised two contentions, first, that the finding of the learned District Judge was erroneous, inasmuch as it ignored unreasonably the title deeds in favour of the appellants, and, second, that the attachment was no longer subsisting. Ragho has been acquitted of the charge levelled against him, and in view of this acquittal there was an automatic lifting of the attachment.

4. None of these contentions, in my opinion, is valid and well-founded. It is true that so far as the press is concerned, the documents on the record show that it stands in the name of appellant Mahabir. There are receipts showing purchases of the materials of the press from different concerns. Reliance was placed particularly upon a letter dated 4-4-1951 (Ext. 4-2), which shows that Mahabir paid the price of the press in instalments and he was allowed time to pay the last instalment.

By a letter dated 29-11-1952, (Ext. 3 (a)-2), the final settlement of the price of the press was made between Mahabir and the Company. Similarly, so far as Sonamati is concerned, the title deeds, namely, the sale deeds as well as the municipal receipts and the rent receipts stand in her name. These documents show prima facie that Mahabir and Sonamati were, respectively, the owners of the press and the land together with the house standing thereon. The question is whether these documents are by themselves sufficient to establish their claim conclusively. The learned District Judge came to the conclusion that they had not means enough to enable them to purchase either the press or the land and the house standing thereon. The total cost of the press is Rs. 3061. Mahabir was employed as a mechanic in various places and his salary was from Rs. 20 to Rs. 80. The maximum salary that he drew was thus Rs. 80 only, and besides himself he had to support his wife.

There was no other source of income so far as Mababir was concerned, and this circumstance greatly influenced the decision of the learned District Judge. Apparently, a man who all his life drew salary from Rs. 20 to Rs. 80 will hardly afford to purchase a press costing Rs. 3000, and odd, especially when he had to maintain himself, besides his wife, for maintenance itself the salary that he drew was not adequate. Mahabir and Ragho formed members of joint Hindu family. There was an allegation that both of them were separate, but this was not established, and no attempt has been made before me to prove separation between the two. Having regard to the known source of income of Mahabir, it cannot be reasonably urged that he could afford to