An acknowledgment of liability in writing within the limitation period can extend the period of limitation for filing a suit.

Shib Chandra Prasad, J.

1. This is an appeal by the defendant against the judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Chapra, reversing the decision of the Munsif of the same place, in a suit filed by the plaintiff, Ganesh Gir, who is now dead and is represented by his widow and sons, for specific performance of contract in respect of an agreement between the parties to a decree passed on compromise on 10th January, 1949.

2. The suit originally had been filed for a decree for Rs. 446/14/- on a simple mortgage bond executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff on 10th June, 1938. It was compromised on 10th January, Z949. The terms settled, inter alia, were that the defendant will pay Rs. 335/- on the amount due, although the claim under the original mortgage deed was Rs. 446/14/- and that he will pay Rs. 50.00 in cash and execute a usufructuary mortgage in favour of the plaintiff for the same land for which the original mortgage had been executed. The amount of the bond will be for the balance of Rs. 285/-. It was alleged that the defendant paid Rs. 50.00 by money-order and subsequently executed a usufructuary mortgage bond, but the registration of the bond was delayed purposely, and, therefore, the plaintiff filed the suit. There was an alternative relief that in case the document cannot be registered, a decree for Rs. 285/- as principal and Rs. 85/13/6 as interest, be passed in favour of the plain-tiff against the defendant.

3. The suit was contested by the appellant, who pleaded, inter alia, that the suit was barred by limitation that the zarpeshgi bond in question was a forged and fabricated document, the defendant having not executed it, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to any decree for money in the alternative.

4. The learned Munsif held that the zarpeshgi bond regarding which specific performance was prayed for was not a genuine document, and, therefore, it could not be registered by the defendant. The plaintiff could not also get a decree for execution of another zarpeshgi bond, nor could he claim a money decree, and that the plaintiffs claim was barred by limitation,

5. The learned Subordinate Judge, in appeal, agreed with the learned Munsif that the zarpeshgi bond in question was not a genuine document, that the claim of the plaintiff in respect of the prayer for getting the document registered by the defendant was not barred by limitation in view of Sec.19 of the Limitation Act, because by two notices, Exts. A and A(1) sent by the defendant to the plaintiff on 4th August, 1949, and 27th June, 1949, respectively, the defendant had acknowledged his liability to that extent.

6. It appears that before the learned Subordinate Judge a point was raised that since it was found that the plaintiff had been guilty of preparing the fabricating document he was not entitled to any relief. The case of Tribeni Prasad Singh V/s. Jai Narain singh, AIR 1937 Pat 425, was cited before him, but he did not accept the contention and distinguished this case. He observed that he did not see any reason for refusing the prayer of the plaintiff for execution of a zarpeshgi deed in lieu of his just dues regarding which his right had been duly acknowledged by the defendant in his notices.

The learned Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiff could not claim a decree for money because there was no acknowledgment regarding that right of his in any of the notices, the notices mentioning only the liability in respect of the execution of the zarpeshgi deed. In the result, he allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif and directed the defendant to execute a fresh zarpeshgi deed in respect of the property and amount mentioned in the compromise decree within three months of the date of the judgment, failing which the plaintiff was to be entitled to get the deed executed through court.

7. The defendant has come up in appeal, and it has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appeal shoul