A party to a contract is required to perform the contract within a reasonable time, and failure to do so may result in the other party treating the contract as revoked and rescinded.

Ramratna Singh, J.

1. Appellant, the Official Receiver of the Calcutta High Court in charge of the estate of one Durgacharan Mitter, was impleaded as a defendant in the two suits out of which these appeals arise. There are two appellants in the memorandum of appeal as there were two defendants in the suits, defendant No. 1 being the Official Receiver by designation and defendant No. 2 being the gentleman who holds that office at present. The estate of Durgacharan Mitter was comprised, inter alia, of the proprietary interest in tauzi No. 4505 of village Majhauli in the district of Patna.

This estate vested in the State of Bihar under the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 some time in 1955 or 1956. In October 1951, tenders were invited on behalf of the receiver for permanent settlement of certain areas of land and sale of trees standing thereon. The tender of Narmadeshwar Prasad Singh, plaintiff of money suit No. 1 of 1955, was accepted in respect of one piece of land and that of Baneshwar Prasad Singh plaintiff of money suit No. 2 of 1955, was accepted in respect of another piece of land; and accordingly these two plaintiffs deposited certain amounts in the then Imperial Bank of India, Patna to the credit of the Official Receiver. But, as documents of settlement were not executed by the Official Receiver for about three years, the plaintiffs treated the contracts as having been revoked and cancelled and demanded the refund of the amounts deposited from the receiver. After some correspondence the receiver sent drafts of leases to the plaintiffs on the 6th July 1954 for their approval.

But the plaintiffs considered the terms of the drafts to be inconsistent with the terms of the notice in response to which they had submitted their tenders and instituted these two suits for recovery of the amounts deposited with damages in the shape of interest at six per cent per annum from the date of the deposit.

2. The case of the plaintiffs was that at the time these tenders were accepted, Sri P.C. Banerji, a representative of the Official Receiver, and Sri A.C. Guha, the local naib of the Official Receiver at Majhauli, promised to complete the deeds of settlement of the lands and sale of trees after obtaining sanction of the Calcutta High Court and to deliver possession of the same to the respective plaintiffs within a period of six months from the date of the deposits of the money; and this the Official Receiver failed to do. It was further alleged that the servants, of the appellant cut and removed some of the trees standing on the land of khala No. 3 and that one Ramcharitra Misra was in possession of plot No. 283 of khata No. 54 since before the tender notice. Another ground for treating the contracts as having been revoked was that the terms of settlement contained in the drafts were against the terms agreed upon. The plaintiffs, therefore, submitted that

(a) the agreement for settlement and sale were void for uncertainty in regard to their essential terms since no terms except the amount of nazrana, were settled;

(b) alternatively, the draft agreements sent to the plaintiffs were so completely different and hedged with such restrictive and penal terms as would amount to a complete refusal by the defendant to perform his part of the contracts.

(c) alternatively, the agreements were void for mutual mistake about the essential terms and conditions of the proposed settlements inasmuch as the plaintiffs always understood that the proposed settlement was to be made comprehensively for any purpose that the plaintiffs might choose to utilise the land for and without any clause for reentry or forfeiture; and

(d) alternatively, the defendant failed to perform his part of the contracts within the time agreed or within a reasonable time and the plaintiffs were entitled to a refund of the advance made and damages.

3. The appellant filed a written statement and asserted that no time limit had been fixed for execution of the documents and there was