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1964 Supreme(Pat) 88
PATNA HIGH COURT
H.Mahapatra and Tarkeshwar Nath JJ.
Ram Udgar Singh
Versus
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, C.N.Division
Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 762 of 1963 ;
Decided On : MAY 06, 1964
A corporate body can act itself before a Labour Court by authorizing a person to do so on its behalf, and such authorization does not constitute representation of the Board in the sense envisaged in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-section (2) of Sec.36 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Headnote:
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT - REPRESENTATION OF EMPLOYER - AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL OFFICER BY RESOLUTION OF BOARD - VALIDITY - Sec.36(2) - Sec.2(g) - Sec.2(k) - Sec.25 - Sec.31 - Sec.32 - Sec.38 - Electricity Act, Sec.5 - Sec.12 - Sec.13.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, an employee of the Bihar State Electricity Board, was dismissed from service. The Board applied to the Labour Court for approval of its action under Sec.33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner objected to the appearance of the Board's Personnel Officer, Md. Arif, on the ground that he was not a person who could answer the descriptions given in any of the sub-clauses of Sub-section (2) of Sec.36 of the Act.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that Md. Arif's appearance was not a representation of the Board, but rather an appearance in person on behalf of the Board. The court found that the Board had passed a resolution authorizing Md. Arif to appear on its behalf, and that this resolution was valid. The court also held that Sec.36 of the Act does not take away the power of a workman or an employer to appear himself and make representation before the Tribunal or a Labour Court in an industrial dispute.
Issues: Whether Md. Arif, the Personnel Officer of the Bihar State Electricity Board, could be deemed to be an employer and, as such, could be permitted to appear before the Labour Court.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the definition of "employer" given in Sec.2(g) of the Industrial Disputes Act is not exhaustive, and that anyone not coming within that definition can still be an employer. The court also held that Sec.36 of the Act does not rule out the fundamental right of a party to appear in person before a Court or a Tribunal, and that denial of such thing will amount to denying the rudimentary justice to the party concerned.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the petition, holding that the Labour Court had not erred in allowing Md. Arif to appear on behalf of the Board.
H.Mahapatra, J.
1. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India by Ramudgar Singh against the Presiding Officer, Labour Court of Criota Nagpur Division at Ranchi, the Bihar Electricity Board through its Chairman Sri R. Mishra and Md. Arif, Personnel Officer (Labour), Bihar State Electricity Board. The petitioner was an employee under the Bihar Electricity Board. He was dismissed by the Electrical Superintending Engineer, Ranchi Electrical Circle, on the 4th of December 1962 from his service. The Electricity Board which was constituted under the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act made an application under Sec.33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act to the Labour Court for approval of their action of dismissal of the petitioner, On the 3rd of July, 1963, opposite party No. 3, Md. Arif, Personnel Officer of the Bihar State Electricity Board, filed his appearance on behalf of the employer before the Labour Court. The General Secretary of the Bihar State Electricity Supply Workers Union was authorised under the provisions made under Sec.36 (1) (a) to represent the petitioner before the Labour Court. He raised an objection against Md. Arifs appearance mainly on the ground that he was not a person who could answer the descriptions given in any of the sub-clauses of Sub-section (2) of Sec.36 of the Industrial Disputes Act. This objection was not accepted by the Labour Court by its order passed on the 30th July, 1963. The petitioner challenges that order and wants that to be quashed in the present proceeding.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner took us to Sections 2, 26, 31 and 32 to contend that Md. Arif cannot be deemed to be an employer in any sense in the case before the Labour Court, and as such, he cannot be permitted to appear before it. Sec.2 (g) defines "employer" and says "employer" means:
"(i) in relation to an industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is prescribed the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of that authority."
It is clear that the present employer, namely, the Bihar State Electricity Board does not come within any of the two definitions. It is a corporate body, under Section 5 of the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (to be referred hereafter, for brevity, Electricity Act). Sec.12 lays down:
"The Board shall be a Body corporate by the name notified under Sub-section (1) of Sec. 5, having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to acquire and hold property both movable and immovable, and shall by the said name sue and be sued."
Sec.13 empowers the Chairman of the Board or any other member authorised by the Board to authenticate all orders and decisions by his signature and also all instruments issued by the Board. Thus the definition of "employer" given in Sec.2 (g) of the Industrial Disputes Act does not apply to the Bihar State Electricity Board, but all the same, they will be in the same position as employer under the Industrial Disputes Act. The definition under Sec.2 (g) is not exhaustive. Anyone not coming within that can still be an employer.
3. Learned counsel then referred to Sec.2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act where "industrial dispute" has been defined as meaning any dispute or differences between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. There is no variance between the parties about the application of that definition to the present case. Sec.25 provides for penalties for workmen and employer in certain cases. Sec.31 lays down that any employer who contravenes the provisions of Sec.33 shall be punishable with imprisonment f
