The right of appeal is a right of substance and ouster of that right cannot easily be inferred unless there is express provision for it in a particular enactment or such provision can be established by necessary implication on compelling grounds.

H.Mahapatra, J.

1. Plaintiff is the appellant. On the 14th of December 1949, plaintiff and defendant No. 1 purchased two portion of plot No. 2783. The plaintiff took the northern side and the defendant the southern. These two blocks have been referred as B and C in the courts below. On account of a dispute about the discharge of rain water from the plaintiffs portion which, before the purchase by the parties, used to be discharged over the southern portion as the slope of plot No. 2783 was from north to south, proceedings under S 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were started at the instance of the plaintiff. They were, however, quashed under the orders of the High Court. Thereafter the plaintiff instituted the present suit for a declaration that they had the right to discharge the rain water from their land through the defendants portion as the natural slope of the land was so constituted. He also asked for an injunction against the defendants restraining them from making any change in the level of their grounds so as to block the flow of the rain water from the plaintiffs land.

While the case was pending in the trial court and a few of the witnesses had been examined on the 6th of February 1960, both the sides made a joint petition asking the Court to refer the dispute to the arbitration of two gentlemen named in that petition, Sri Sitaram Rungta and Sri Biswanath Mundhra. They asked that the entire matter in dispute between the parties should be sent for arbitration of those two persons. The arbitrators took several adjournments from the Court after a reference was made to them, and on the 9th of January 1961 they filed their award, notice of which was given to both the parties. An objection was filed on behalf of the plaintiff against that award. His grievance was that the responsibility for completion of the work in the plaintiffs ground by way of changing the natural slope of the land, as given in the award, was undertaken by the arbitrators, and that the award which was based on an agreement between the parties before the arbitrators did not contain the basis of that agreement involving the change in the municipal drain situate on the northern side of the plaintiffs land.

A rejoinder was filed by the defendants, and on hearing both the parties the court passed an order on the 27th of April 1961 modifying the award to some extent and ordered that the award may be accepted after modification to the effect that the defendants were directed to complete the earth work as proposed in the award before the 15th June 1961 failing which the plaintiff would be entitled to enforce the decree specifically against the defendants. The court decreed the suit against the defendants in terms of the award as modified and directed a decree to be drawn up accordingly. In pursuance thereof a decree was drawn up on the 11th of May 1961 signed by the learned Munsif. Against that an appeal was taken to the District Judge by the plaintiff without any success. The present second appeal is directed against that, and the plaintiff is the appellant.

2. As I have indicated above, the dispute between the parties in the suit was about the right of the plaintiff to discharge the rain water horn his land over the land belonging to the defendants which lies to the south of the plaintiffs land. He claimed that as the natural slope and the defendants were trying to obstruct that flow of rain water by obstructing the natural slope in making constructions on the land and also raising the level of the vacant grounds. The dispute between the parties, therefore, was about plaintiffs right to discharge rain water from his land to the south and over the defendants land. The defendant denied this right of the plaintiff and raised several pleas in answer to the action against them. This was the subject-matter that was referred, on agreement between the parties, by the court to arbitration by two gentlemen of the town; one of them was the Chairman of the