1964 Supreme(Pat) 123
PATNA HIGH COURT
H.Mahapatra and A.B.N.Sinha JJ.
Harishanker Prasad
Versus
Bishwanath Prasad
Appeal From Original Order No. 398 of 1960 ;
Decided On : AUGUST 27, 1964
A compromise is lawful if it does not violate any law, is not fraudulent, does not involve injury to the property of another, and is not opposed to public policy.
Headnote:
COMPROMISE - LAWFULNESS - SHEBAITSHIP - ENDOWMENT - PUBLIC POLICY - ACCOUNTABILITY - DEVOLUTION OF OFFICE - FUTURE MANAGEMENT - INTEREST OF DEITIES - PARTIES TO SUIT - IDOLS AS PARTIES - INTERESTS OF PENDENTE LITE TRANSFEREE - TRUSTEESHIP - PRIVATE TRUST - RECORDING OF COMPROMISE.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiffs and defendants filed a petition of compromise in a suit related to Shebaitship of certain endowed properties. Defendant No. 14 and defendants fourth party objected to the recording of the compromise. The trial court recorded the compromise after rejecting the objections. Defendants 8 to 11 filed an appeal against the order of the trial court.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the compromise was lawful except for the portion related to the succession of the heirs of plaintiff No. 1 and defendant No. 1. The court modified the order of the trial court and directed that the compromise be recorded except for the said portion.
Issues: 1. Whether the compromise was lawful? 2. Whether the trial court erred in recording the compromise?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the compromise was lawful except for the portion related to the succession of the heirs of plaintiff No. 1 and defendant No. 1. The court reasoned that the terms of the compromise did not violate any law, were not fraudulent, did not involve injury to the property of another, and were not opposed to public policy. The court further held that the compromise adjusted the whole suit and that the parties were satisfied with the terms of the compromise. 2. The court held that the trial court did not err in recording the compromise. The court reasoned that the trial court was satisfied that the compromise was lawful and that it adjusted the whole suit. The court further held that the objections raised by defendants 8 to 11 were not tenable.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed in part. The court modified the order of the trial court and directed that the compromise be recorded except for the portion related to the succession of the heirs of plaintiff No. 1 and defendant No. 1.
H.Mahapatra, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the order of the second additional Court of the Subordinate Judge, Muzaffarpur, in Title Suit No. 33/1 of 1956/1960 by which he recorded a compromise.
2. Sakhichand Sahu, the common ancestor ot the parties had five sons, Jagarnath, Raghunandan. Ramkhal, Dwarka and Badri Narain. Of them, Jagarnath and Dwarka are dead leaving no issue. Sakhichand Sahu had acquired large properties during his life and he executed a deed of endowment on the 3rd of April, 1900 in respect of some properties in favour of the deities Sri Ram Lachhuman Jankiji, Sri Radha Krishnaji and Shiva Girjaji and others. In that deed he stipulated that during his lifetime he would act as manager and Shebait and after him his eldest son Jagarnath Prasad Sahu would be the Shebait and work in consultation with his fourth son Dwarka Prasad Sahu. He further provided that Jagarnath will be competent to authorise anyone of Dwarka Prasad and Badri Narain to be Shebait after him and that Shebait would nominate his succeeding Shebait in consultation with the members of the family of Sakhichand. Badri Narain became the Shebait after Jagarnath. According to the plaintiffs, he appointed plaintiff No. 1, one of his sons, to be the next Shebait by a deed of appointment dated the 14th October 1955. Defendant No. 1, another son of Badri Narain, however, claimed that he had been appointed as the next Shebait by a resolution passed in a meeting of the members of the family as he was the oldest and ablest of all the sons of Badri Narain. This dispute led the plaintiffs to institute the suit. Four sets of defendants were impleaded; Badri Narains sons by his first wife were defendants first and second parties, defendants 8 to 14, descendants of Raghunandan and Ramkhal were defendants third party and defendants fourth party were the tenants. Plaintiffs own brother and mother joined in the suit as plaintiffs 2 and 3.
3. A petition of compromise was filed in the trial court on the 9th of May 1957 by the plaintiffs and all the defendants except defendant No. 14 and defendants fourth party. On that day the plaintiffs applied to expunge the defendants fourth party from the suit. On the 28th of May 1957 defendant No. 14 filed an objection against recording of that compromise. So also objections were filed by defendants 8 to 13 but defendants 12 and 18 withdrew their objections later. Defendant No. 14 was expunged by an order of the court passed on the 30th August 1957 on an application filed by the plaintiffs and defendant No, 1, Thus the only objection to the recording of compromise that remained for consideration by the Court below was by defendants 8 to 11. They raised two grounds; one was that they had signed the petition of compromise without reading its contents and at a time when the defendant No. 8s child was seriously ill. The other ground was that the terms of the compromise were unlawful inasmuch as it came in conflict with the terms of the deed of endowment.
4. The trial court held against them on both the points and passed order to record the compromise. Against that, defendants 8 to 11 have come in appeal.
5. Learned counsel for the appellants faintly contended against the finding on the first ground of objection. The evidence disclosed that the infant child of defendant No. 8 was about six months old and succumbed at about 4 Oclock on the 7th May 1957. It is not said that the compromise petition was signed after that. All of the defendants 8 to 13 had signed the compromise. The trial court was justified to discard the case that all of them were in a distracted mind so as not to know the contents of the compromise petition which they signed. 6. Learned counsels emphasis was on the second ground of objection. He urged that the court must be satisfied that the compromise is lawful before it can record it. In this ease, the terms of the compromise were unlawful, according to him, as they were opposed to the terms of the de