1965 Supreme(Pat) 116
PATNA HIGH COURT
R.L.Narasimham and S.N.P.Singh JJ.
Balaram Singh Deo
Versus
Madhu Sudan Singh Deo
Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 1357 of 1962 ;
Decided On : OCTOBER 27, 1965
A judgment delivered by the ruler sitting as a Court in a dispute between parties cannot be said to be the law prevailing in the State prior to its merger.
Headnote:
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, ARTICLES 226, 227 - BIHAR LAND REFORMS ACT, SECTION 27 - EVIDENCE ACT, SECTION 18 - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, ORDER 41, RULE 27 - CUSTOM OF IMPARTIBILITY - ADMISSIBILITY OF JUDGMENT AS EVIDENCE - POWER OF APPELLATE COURT TO ADMIT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.
Fact of the Case:
Petitioner, a junior member of the Seraikella Raj family, claimed the entire compensation for the acquisition of tenures by the Government of Bihar, arguing that the khorposh grant of the junior members was impartible and descended by the rule of lineal primogeniture. The Compensation Officer apportioned the compensation among the petitioner and respondents, who were also descended from the common ancestor. On appeal, the petitioner sought to admit a judgment of the Maharaja of Seraikella, holding that khorposh properties were impartible and descended by primogeniture, as additional evidence.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the judgment of the Maharaja was not the law in force in Seraikella State prior to merger and could not be admitted as additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure. The court found no error of law apparent on the face of the record in the appellate court's refusal to admit the evidence.
Issues: 1. Whether the judgment of the Maharaja of Seraikella was the law in force in Seraikella State prior to merger and could be admitted as additional evidence. 2. Whether the appellate court erred in refusing to admit the evidence.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. A judgment delivered by the ruler sitting as a Court in a dispute between parties cannot be said to be the law prevailing in the State prior to its merger. 2. The appellate court has the discretion to admit additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure, and its decision will not be interfered with unless there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record.
Final Decision: The application was dismissed with costs.
Narasimham, J.
1. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution against the judgment of Misra, J. sitting as an appellate Court under Sec.27 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, dismissing the petitioners appeal against the order of the Compensation Officer apportioning the compensation payable in respect of various tenures within the former State of Seraikella which were taken over by the Government under the provisions of the said Act. The petitioners case was that he and respondents Nos. 1 to 3 were junior members of the Seraikella Raj family and that their ancestor was given khorposh grant (maintenance grant) by the then Raja of Seraikella in accordance with the custom prevailing in the State for the maintenance of junior members of the Raj family. The petitioner further alleged that by virtue of a special custom the khorposh grant of the junior member of the Seraikella Raj family was also governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture and that the petitioner as a male descendant of the eldest line was entitled to the whole of the compensation payable for the acquisition of the tenures by Government of Bihar. The learned Compensation Officer, however, held, on the evidence adduced before him, that the petitioner was only entitled to two-fifths share and that the remaining three-fifth share should be divided equally amongst the three respondents who are also descended from the original common ancestor, though they belong to a younger branch. In coming to this decision he relied on some evidence, especially the khatian, adduced before him.
2. On appeal before Misra, J., on behalf of the petitioner an application was made for admitting as additional evidence under O. 41. R. 27, of the Code of Civil Procedure, several documents, the most important of which was the judgment of the Maharaja of Seraikella (Annexure C) in P. H. No. 131 of 1938-39, disposed of on the 28th December 1939. In that judgment the ruler of Seraikella. sitting as a Court in a dispute between some of the maintenance holders (khorposhdars) of the State, held that the khorposh properties in the State were impartible by custom and that they also descended by the rule of primogeniture. It is true that the judgment was not between the parties in the present dispute or their predecessors in interest, but it might be a valuable piece of evidence as regards the custom of impartibility prevailing in respect of khorposh grants in Seraikella State prior to its merger on the 1st January 1948. The learned Judge, however, refused to allow additional evidence to be taken at the appellate stage, observing that "no sufficient cause has been made out for admitting the documents in question."
3. It is now well settled that the power of certiorari against a judicial or quasi judicial order can be exercised only when there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. I am leaving out of consideration jurisdictional grounds which obviously have no application here. We are unable to find any error of law apparent on the face of the record in the judgment of Misra, J. Merely because he refused to exercise his discretion to admit additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure, it cannot bo said that there is any error of law apparent on the face of the record. The question ultimately depends on whether he was satisfied with the explanation given for not adducing this valuable document before the Compensation Officer at the earliest stage and whether he thought that this document was necessary with a view to enable him to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause
4. Mr. Sinha was fully aware of this difficulty, but he tried to get out of it by a very ingenious argument. He urged that prior to merger the ruler of Seraikella State was a sovereign in whom was combined the executive, legislative and judicial powers within his State. According to Mr. Sinha. the judgment of the ruler in P. Rule No 131 of 1938-39 (Annexure