Forfeiture of property under S. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act is a mandatory penalty that must be imposed at the time of conviction and cannot be ordered at a subsequent stage.

ANANT SINGH, J.

1. The petitioner was convicted under S. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act for violation of R. 3 of the Sugar (Movement Control) Order, 1955, by a Magistrate, Mr. S.C. Gupta, First Class, Baghmara, in the district of Dnanbad in connection with the movement of 91 bags of sugar by a truck. The conviction of the petitioner was maintained by this Court with some modification in the sentence in Criminal Revision No. 564 of 1961 disposed of by me, while sitting singly, on the 18th September, 1961. There was, however, no order passed by the Magistrate, while convicting the petitioner, either for forfeiture of the 91 bags of sugar or any part thereof, as provided in sub-cl. (b) of S. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, to be referred to hereafter as the Act. The petitioner, while the aforesaid criminal revision was being heard by me, made a prayer for the refund of the 91 bags of sugar or the price thereof. I then passed an order that it was open to the petitioner to apply for the refund before the trial Court, since that matter was not for consideration before me in the aforesaid criminal revision. The petitioner filed a petition on the, 31st January, 1962 before the trial Court for refund of 91 bags of sugar or the value thereof. The learned Magistrate, by his order, dated the 18th April 1962, rejected the petition and made an order forfeiting the 91 bags of sugar to the State of Bihar. The petitioner then preferred an appeal to the Sessions Judge, who, by his order, dated the 6th July 1962, upheld the Magistrates order forfeiting the bags of sugar. This application has been filed against the aforesaid order of the learned Sessions Judge.

2. Mrs. Lall, appearing for the petitioner, has drawn our attention to the provisions of S. 7 of the Act which provides three kinds of penalties for contravention of any order made under S. 3 of the Act : One is imprisonment for a specific term depending on the nature of the offence, the second is fine which is optional, and the third is forfeiture of the property in respect of which the order has been contravened, or a part thereof. It should be noticed that the sentence of imprisonment and forfeiture are mandatory, unless an order to the contrary is made in respect of the either penalty as has been provided under the two provisions - one appearing under the provision of imprisonment and the other appealing under the provision of forfeiture. I may, however, quote the provision relating to forfeiture, as provided in sub-cl. (b) of S. 7 of the Act :

"(b) any property in respect of which the order has been contravened or such part thereof as to the Court may seem fit shall be forfeited to the Government : Provided that it the Court is of opinion that if is not necessary to direct forfeiture in respect of the whole or, as the case may be, any part of the property, it may, for reasons to be recorded, refrain from doing so".

3. It would appear that the Court, while convicting an accused for violation of an order under the Act, is required to impose a sentence of imprisonment and also to order forfeiture of either the whole of the property or a part thereof in respect of which the order has been contravened, and if it does not decide to pass a sentence of imprisonment and an order of forfeiture, it has to give its reasons for not doing so. In the instant case, however, the Court, while convicting the petitioner, did not pass any order of forfeiture and also assigned no reasons for acting to the contrary. The fact remains that no order for forfeiture was passed at the time of delivering the judgement. The question is whether in such a situation the Court could pass an order of forfeiture at any subsequent stage under any of the provisions of the Act or under the provisions of S. 517 of the Cr. P.C.

4. Section 517 of the Cr. P.C., no doubt, provides for confiscation, amongst other things, of any property after the conclusion of a trial. This, however, is a general provision, and in