A transferee Magistrate has the power to summon additional accused who were not named in the original complaint, as long as the offence and the offenders come within his territorial jurisdiction. Sec.195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires a complaint by a court for certain offences, does not prohibit the transferee Magistrate from taking cognizance of the whole case and proceeding against all persons found to be concerned in the offence.

Ramratna Singh, J.

1. The facts Riving rise to this application are these. On the 10th June, 1954 the Sub-divisional Officer of Patna made a complaint in writing to the District Magistrate for prosecution of the Gyanchand Dusadh under Sec.205/419/420 of the Penal Code for committing an offence by fraudulently subscribing on the 6th January, 1964 a bail bond in the name of his dead father as a bailor for the release of Birja Rai Dusadh and Girja Rai Dusadh, who constituted the first party in a proceeding under Sec.107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before him. The District Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and transferred the case to Mr. Ahmad, Judicial Magistrate, Patna for disposal. One Jagrup Gope, who was the second party in that proceeding filed on the 2nd July, 1964 a petition before Mr. Ahmad that the said Birja and Girja be also summoned as accused, and Mr. Ahmad summoned them. Some witnesses were examined before him. One of them, namely, Sri Lakshmi Narain, Mokhtar, who had identified the bailor, Gobardhan Das on the bail bond, said in his evidence that one Kamla Singh introduced Gyanchand as Gobardhan to him and Gyanchand also told him that he was Gobardhan. He further added that Kamla, who was a Mokhtars clerk, had scribed the bail bond. On the 19th February, 1965. Mr. Ahmad passed the following order.

"Accused present and represented. I have perused the evidence of P. W. Lakshmi Narain in which he says that Kamla Pd. introduced the bailor Gobardhan Das. This reveals prima facie that Kamla abelted the offence of forgery and impersonation.

Summon Kamla to face trial.

Evidences will have to be adduced afresh summon all the P. Ws. of the complaint petition P. K. Sushama through S. D. O. Sadar. Fix 11-3-65."

2. Kamla Prasad Singh, the petitioner in this court, appeared in the court of Mr. Ahmad on the 11th March, 1965, and he took further evidence in the case and proceeded with the trial, when the present application was filed in this court on the 17th May, 1965. It was admitted on the 19th May, and further proceedings in the court below were stayed. This application was taken up for hearing on the 12th September. 1966 before S.P. Singh. J., and an objection to the maintainability of this application was made before him on the ground that the petitioner had come up to this court, without having moved the Sessions Judge first for reference of the matter to this Court, as is the practice prevailing for a long time.

On behalf of the petitioner it was urged before his Lordship that, inasmuch as. by Article 131 of the new Limitation Act a period of ninety days from the date of the order sought to be revised has been prescribed for an application in revision, the petitioner could not have taken the risk of the application in revision to become time-barred by moving the Sessions Judge, in the first instance, to make a reference to this court. As no decision of this court was cited before the learned judge on this point, his Lordship referred the case to division bench on the 12th September, 1966, and then this case was placed before us for hearing.

3. This very question came up for decision before us in Criminal Revn. No. 1018 of 1965, Sahdev Mandal T. Honga Murmu. D/-13-9-1966: (AIR 1967 Pat 223) and it was held that such an application in revision could be filed directly in this court, without moving the Sessions Judge, in the first instance, for making a reference to this court in respect of the order sought to be revised, because of the period of limitation prescribed in Article 131 of the Limitation Ad and that the practice of this court, referred to above, came into existence on account of the fact that no period of limitation had been prescribed for such application in the earlier Limitation Act. On this occasion before us, learned counsel for the opposite party did not place any argument which had not been considered in the said decision. Hence, it must be held that the present application in revision