A decree for costs is not a debt within the meaning of Section 214(1)(b) of the Succession Act, 1925. Therefore, no succession certificate is required for the execution of a decree for costs.

G.N.Prasad, J.

1. These two connected Civil Revision applications have been preferred by the judgment-debtors under the following circumstances: The petitioners had instituted a money suit against (1) Nirsu Singh, and (2) Mossomat Murti. The suit was decreed against Nirsu Singh, but it was dismissed against Mossomat Murti, who was awarded costs of the suit. Mossomat Murti, however, died without executing the decree for costs. Thereafter, Ramsewak Singh and Lachhmi Singh (the opposite party in this Court) put the decree for costs into execution in Execution Case No. 10 of 1961 alleging themselves to be the next heirs of Mossomat Murti. In that execution case, 2 bighas 8 kathas of land belonging to the petitioners was auction sold and purchased by the opposite party for Rs. 400, the sale having been held on the 3rd December 1963. The sale was confirmed on the 11th January 1964.

2. Meanwhile, on the 26th November 1963, the petitioners had put an application for release of the said land from attachment and sale, and that was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 34 of 1963. Upon that application, the sale had been stayed until 2-12-1963. On 2-12-1963, neither party took any steps and, therefore, the sale took place on 3-12-1963, as stated above. On 44-1964, the record was put up for the confirmation of the sale. Since, however, Miscellaneous Case No, 34 of 1963 was still pending, the question of confirmation of the sale was adjourned to 11-1-1964. On 11-1-1964, the petitioners took no steps and the result was that Miscellaneous Case No. 34 of 1963 was dismissed for non-prosecution. Then on 2-3-1964 the petitioners filed Miscellaneous Case No. 5 of 1964 under Sec.151, Code of Civil Procedure, for the restoration of Miscellaneous Case No. 34 of 1963 which had been dismissed for non-prosecution, as already stated, on 11-1-1964. Also on 2-3-1964, the petitioners filed Miscellaneous Case No. 6 of 1964 for setting aside the auction sale under Order 21, Rule 90, Code of Civil Procedure. After various adjournments, both these Miscellaneous cases were put up for hearing on 9-1-1965. On that date, the petitioners put in an application for time in both the cases.

In Miscellaneous Case No. 5 of 1964, they applied for time on the ground that their witnesses had not come to Court, being busy in Paddy harvesting, and in Miscellaneous Case No. 6 of 1964, they applied for time on the ground that they had applied for obtaining the certified copy of certain documents in Nepal, but they had not yet received the same. Both the petitions for time were rejected with the observation that the petitioners had applied for time on four earlier occasions on almost similar grounds and the petitions for further adjournment were frivolous. Both the cases were thereafter called on for hearing, one after the other, but none responded to the calls on behalf of the petitioners. Hence they were both dismissed for non-prosecution. Then on 2-2-1965, the petitioners filed Miscellaneous Case No. 3 of 1965 for restoration of Miscellaneous Case No. 5 of 1964 which, after hearing, was dismissed on 22-3-1966. Against that order, the petitioners have filed Civil Revision No. 890 of 1966.

3. Against the dismissal order recorded on 9-1-1965 in Miscellaneous Case No. 8 of 1964, the petitioners preferred an appeal, namely, Miscellaneous Appeal No. 8 of 1965 before the District Judge, Muzaffarpur. The learned Judge, however, dismissed the appeal on 15-1-1966, and that has given rise to Civil Revision No. 633 of 1966.

4. In both these cases, the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioners was mat the entire execution proceedings taken in Execution Case No. 10 of 1961 were without jurisdiction since Ramsewak Singh and Lachhmi Singh had levied execution for realisation of the decree for costs which had been awarded to Mossomat Murti without obtaining a succession certificate from a competent Court. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the petitioners reli