The inherent jurisdiction of the court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked to circumvent the law of limitation.

1. The defendants are the petitioners in this case. On the 25th May, 1964, a suit was filed by the Board of Religious Trusts for a declaration that the Thakurbari. Trustees whereof are the defendants, and all the properties attached thereto are Hindu public trust properties, and not private one. After the plaint was admitted on the 18th June, 1964, an order was passed on that very date for the plaintiff to file process-fees and written processes by the 4th July, 1964. Thereafter, several adjournments were given in the case for the purpose of filing process-fees and written processes; but the plaintiff did not comply with the order, and, ultimately, on the 14th November, 1964, the suit was dismissed for default of the plaintiff to file process-fees and processes. On the 18th February, 1965, an application under Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed by the plaintiff for setting aside the dismissal of the suit. In that application, the plaintiff alleged that it came to know of the order of the dismissal of the suit on the 26th December, 1964. The Court below held that the application for restoration of the suit was barred by time, and, therefore, it could not be allowed. But, it took the view that the Court was wrong in dismissing the suit on the 14th November, 1964; inasmuch as it had not fixed a date of hearing before passing the order for filing of process-fees and written processes, the Court had committed a mistake, and it could correct that mistake under Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for which there was no period of limitation. The Court below, therefore, set aside the order of dismissal of the suit for default. Being thus aggrieved, the defendants have filed this revision application.

2. The Court below has relied on a single Judge decision of this Court in Sripati Saran Parasad Singh V/s. Indrajit Mahton, AIR 1939 Pat 160. In that case, the Munsif of Bihai had declined to restore three rent suits under Order 9, Rule 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure, because the plaintiff, having been called upon to file process-fees and copies of plaint, had failed to comply with the Courts order, and the suits were dismissed for default. The learned Single Judge of this Court held that the order of the Munsif was illegal, because he had no power to require a plaintiff to file process-fees before fixing a date for the appearance of the defendant. No. authority for this proposition of law was cited for taking that view; nor any cogent reason was given for supporting the view taken by his Lordship. There is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure with regard to the fixing of a date before calling upon the plaintiff to file process-fees and processes. In absence of any such provision, it could be open to the Court either to fix a date for the appearance of the defendant and then demand process-fees, etc., or to require the plaintiff to file the process-fees, etc., and thereafter fix a date for the appearance of the defendant for hearing. Rule 1 (1) of Order 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf. Rule 5 of Order 5 lays down that the Court shall determine, at the time of issuing the summons, whether it shall be for the settlement of issues only, or for the final disposal of the suit; and the summons shall contain a direction accordingly: Provided that, in every suit heard by a Court of Small Causes, the summons shall be for the final disposal of the suit. Under this provision, the Court has to determine, at the time of issuing the summons, whether the date to be specified in the summons will be for the settlement of issues only, or for the final disposal of the suit. In other words, the Court, at the time of issuing summons, could determine the date on which the issues may have to be settled or the suit may have to be finally disposed of. Therefore, it is evident that the process-fees, etc.,