The High Court has the power to allow the composition of offences under Section 345(5A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even though the revisional application has been admitted only on the question of sentence.

S.N.P.Singh, J.

1. All the six petitioners have been convicted under Sec.379 of the Indian Penal Code and each of them has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. They have also been convicted under Sec. 447 of the Indian Penal Code and each of them has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month Sheo Saran Thakur (Petitioner No. 1) has been further convicted under Sections 324 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months under each of the counts. Ram Ratan Thakur (Petitioner No. 3) and Ram Dayal Thakur (petitioner No. 6) have been convicted under Sec.323 of the Indian Penal Code and under Sec.147 of the Indian Penal Code and each of them has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month under each count. Ram Saran Tbakur (petitioner No. 2). Benarsi Thakur alias Birender Sharma (petitioner No. 4) and Dharam Nath Thakur alias Dharam Nath Sharma (petitioner No. 5) have also been convicted under Sec.147 of the Indian Penal Code and each of them has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. The sentences on the petitioners for the various offences have been ordered to run concurrently.

2. The application in revision filed by the petitioners was admitted only on the question of sentence. It appears that consequently a petition of compromise between the complainant and the petitioners was filed in this Court. On the 26th of April, 1967, when the revisional application came up for hearing before the learned single judge, a question arose whether permission to compound the offences could be granted when a revisional application has been admitted on the question if sentence only.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners relied on two unreported decisions of this Court, namely, Criminal Revn. No. 72 of 1962 (Pat) and Criminal Revn. No. 856 of 1966 (Pat) in which permission to compound the offences had been given although the revisional applications had been admitted only on the question of sentence. Reliance was also placed on a Bench decision of this Court in Shaikh Idris V/s. Emperor, AIR 1939 Patna 349 where the accused had been acquitted although the application in revision had been admitted only on the question of sentence. The learned single judge however, took the view that the question as to whether an order allowing compromise could be passed by thp court when an application in revision has been admitted only on the question of sentence was neither raised nor decided in the case of AIR 1939 Pat 349. According to the learned Judge, when the conviction and sentence of an accused as made by the trial court and upheld by the appellate court are challenged in a revision petition and after hearing counsel for the petitioner an order is passed admitting the petition on the point of sentence only, that order amounts to a rejection of the petition on all the points except the point of sentence and it has the effect of confirming the conviction of the petitioner under the different sections as made by the lower appellate court. That being the position, it is no longer open to this Court to set aside the conviction either on hearing the case on merits or on basis of any compromise that may be subsequently entered into by the parties as this would in effect amount to a reversal of the order passed by this Court at the time of admission of the petition.

4. After hearing learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and learned counsel appearing for the State, who assisted the Court in this case also, I am of the opinion that in the instant case it is not necessary to go into the wider question whether the High Court can or can not consider the case on merit at the time of final hearing when an application in revision has been admitted only on the question of sentence. I may only state that there are instances in which this Court has interfered on merit at the time of hearing although the ap