SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1968 Supreme(Pat) 168

PATNA HIGH COURT
H.Mahapatra, J.
Mt.Natho
Versus
Sital Prasad Sahu
Appeal From Appellate Decree No. 273 of 1966 ;
Decided On : SEPTEMBER 16, 1968

Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act requires 15 days notice expiring with the month of tenancy to terminate a monthly tenancy, and the date of refusal of notice is included in the computation of the 15 days period.

Headnote:

Notice - Ejectment - Validity of Notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act

Fact of the Case:

The defendants were sued for ejectment due to default in payment of monthly rent and arrears. The notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act was refused by the defendants, who argued that the notice was invalid as it did not provide 15 clear days to vacate the premises.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the notice was valid as it provided 15 days notice expiring with the end of the month of tenancy, in accordance with Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The court dismissed the appeal due to the validity of the notice.

Issues: Validity of notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act

Ratio Decidendi: Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act requires 15 days notice expiring with the month of tenancy to terminate a monthly tenancy. The date of refusal of notice is included in the computation of the 15 days period.

Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and no order for costs was made.

Judgment

H.Mahapatra, J.

1. The defendants in an action for ejectment on the ground of default in payment of monthly rent are the appellants. They were sued against as they had failed to pay rent from Aghan to Baisakh, 1371 Fs. Arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 42/- were also claimed against them. The courts below have found that there was default, incurring liability of eviction. A notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been given to the defendants before the suit was instituted. That notice, however, was refused on the 14th of March, 1964. In that notice the plaintiff had called upon the defendants to vacate the premises within 15 days of receipt of the notice.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the defendant-appellants contended that the notice (exhibit 3) was invalid inasmuch as 15 clear days was not Riven to the defendants after that notice to vacate the premises. The notice (exhibit 3) was issued on the 9th March, 1964. On the 13th March, 1964, the postal peon made an endorsement that the addressee was not found. On the next day, i.e. on the 14th March, 1964, the postal peon made another endorsement saying that it had been refused by the addressee. The postman was examined as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff to prove the endorsement and the fact of refusal.

3. It is true that the monthly tenancy was according to Fasli calendar year and the Hth March, 1964 on which the defendants refused to receive the notice corresponded to the 16th Chait, 1371 Fs. The last day of Chait of that year corresponded to the 28th March. 1964 as stated by the appellate Court. The trial court, however, mentioned in its judgment that the 30th Chait corresponded to the 29th March. 1964. Learned counsel conceded that if. the 29th March, 1964 was the last day of Chait, 1371 Fs. then there were 115 clear days notice to the defendants but he argued that the appellate courts statement about the last day of Chait being the 28th March, 1964, was correct. Learned counsel, however, was unable to show that the trial courts statement of the date was wrong. Assuming that the 28th March, 1964 was the last day of Chait. 1371 Fs., there were 15 days notice expiring with the end of the month of Chait. Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that in such cases 15 days notice expiring with the month of tenancy is required to terminate the monthly tenancy. "Ending with" indicates that the last day of the month of tenancy will be taken in computation of the period of 15 days. The date on which the notice is received or refused will also be included in computation of the 15 days period because neither Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act nor any other provision in law has prescribed that the period of 15 days will be from the date of receipt of the notice.

It is only when the word "from" is used With reference to the computation of a particular period that the date from which the computation is to begin is excluded from computation. But if the expression in such context is either "beginning with" or "ending with" then those dates are not required to be omitted from computation. Section 9 of the General Clauses Act may be referred in this connection. In the view that I have taken with reference to the provisions made under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act for the purpose of computation of the period of 15 days the date of refusal of notice (exhibit 3) by the defendants being the 16th Chait, 1371 Fs., will give 15 days notice expiring with the 30th Chait, 1371 Fs.

4. The result, therefore, is that the contention raised on behalf of the appellants that the notice (exhibit 3) was invalid cannot be upheld. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order for costs of this Court.

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Judicial Analysis

AI

SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top