Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, does not bar the reversioners from challenging a transfer made by a Hindu widow if the transfer is open to challenge under the Hindu law as it existed before the Act came into force.

Untwalia, J.

1. The relevant facts in the suit giving rise to this second appeal at the instance of the plaintiffs are in a short compass. One Bandhu Singh died leaving behind his widow Sunder Kuer (defendant No. 2) and four daughters, three of whom are the three plaintiff-appellants and the fourth one is Deomati Kuer, defendant No. 1. Defendants 1 and 2 are respectively respondents 1 and 2 in this second appeal. Sunder Kuer executed a deed of gift on the 13th of May, 1955, in favour of Deomati Kuer in respect of the suit properties. The plaintiffs suit is for setting aside the deed of gift aforesaid on the ground of fraud and for a declaration that in any event it is ineffective and inoperative beyond the life time of Sunder Kuer. In other words, the suit was filed by the next reversioners challenging the gift made by a Hindu widow in favour of her one daughter to the exclusion of the other three, which gift was made before coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 , Central Act XXX of 1956 (hereinafter called the Act).

The attack on the deed of gift was twofold, one on the ground of practice of fraud by the husband of defendant No. 3 upon defendant No. 2, and the other on the usual ground that in any event it could not be valid as against the reversioners on the death of the widow. Defendants 1 and 2 filed their separate written statements but their defence was common. The defence was that possession over the suit properties was delivered to defendant No. 1 in pursuance of the deed of gift dated the 13th of May, 1955, sometime in July, 1956. Defendant No. 2 executed another deed of gift in favour of defendant No. 1 on the 3rd December, 1959, which was during the pendency of the suit, which was filed on 2nd of July, 1959. The main plea taken on behalf of the defendants was that the plaintiffs had no right to challenge the deed of gift after coming into force of the Act.

2. Both the courts have found that the donee namely, Deomati Kuer, came in possession of the properties covered by the deed of gift dated the 13th May, 1955, immediately on the execution of the document. The second deed of gift dated 3rd of December, 1959, therefore, was of no consequence in this case. The Courts below have also taken the view that defendant No. 2 having parted with her entire interest in the properties gifted by her to her daughter defendant No. 1, was not possessed of any property on the 17th of June 1956, when the Act came into force. She did not, therefore, become the absolute owner of the properties. That being so, on the proposition of law which is firmly established by now by this Court as also by the Supreme Court the reversioners had a right to challenge the gift. But the Courts below, however, have taken the view that because the donee in this case is a Hindu female, under Sec.14 of the Act she became an absolute owner, and, since the donee became an absolute owner, the transfer by the donor namely. Sunder Kner, the widow, could not be challenged by the next reversioners of her husband. The plaintiffs have come up in second appeal to this Court.

3. The question which falls for consideration in this appeal is whether the view taken by the Courts below is correct that is to say, whether because of the alleged acquisition of absolute ownership by defendant No. 1 under Sec.14 of the Act the reversioners had no right to challenge the transfer made by defendant No. 2.

4. In my opinion the learned Subordinate Judge has committed an error of law in the view which he has taken in this case. In my opinion it was not a case where it was necessary to find out whether the donee defendant No. 1 had acquired any absolute ownership in the properties gifted to her under Sec.14 of the Act. No restrictive clause in the deed of gift dated the 13th May, 1955 has been referred to by either of the Courts below to warrant a consideration of the point as to whether the donee had become an absolute owner under Sec.14 of the Act. The question