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1971 Supreme(Pat) 156

PATNA HIGH COURT
Shambhu Prasad Singh, J.
Binapani Sarkar
Versus
Inderdeo Singh
Appeal From Appellate Decree No. 712 of 1968 ;
Decided On : NOVEMBER 17, 1971

A landlord can evict a tenant for breach of the implied condition of tenancy, such as using the property for a purpose other than that for which it was leased or committing an act that is destructive or permanently injurious to the property.

Headnote:

TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882 - SECTION 108(O) - LEASE - BREACH OF COVENANT - EVICTION - PERSONAL NECESSITY - SUB-LETTING - INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 108(O) - USE OF PROPERTY FOR PURPOSE OTHER THAN THAT FOR WHICH IT WAS LEASED - DESTRUCTIVE OR PERMANENTLY INJURIOUS ACT - IMPLIED CONDITION OF TENANCY - NOTICE UNDER SECTION 106.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for eviction of the defendant-respondent from a house on the grounds of personal necessity, sub-letting of rooms to persons suffering from diseases, and denial of title. The trial court decreed the suit on the ground of sub-letting, but the lower appellate court reversed the finding and dismissed the suit.

Finding of the Court:

The High Court found that the respondent was allowing persons suffering from diseases like tuberculosis and cancer to stay in the house, which amounted to a breach of the implied condition of tenancy and liable to be evicted under Clause (a) of Sec.11 (1) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947.

Issues: 1. Whether the respondent was allowing persons suffering from diseases like tuberculosis and cancer to stay in the house? 2. Whether such use of the house amounted to a breach of the implied condition of tenancy? 3. Whether the appellant was entitled to evict the respondent on the ground of breach of the terms of tenancy?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The High Court held that the finding of the lower appellate court that the respondent was allowing persons suffering from diseases like tuberculosis and cancer to stay in the house was a finding of fact and binding on the High Court in Second Appeal. 2. The High Court interpreted Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and held that the respondent was using the house for a purpose other than that for which it was given to him, and that such use was destructive or permanently injurious to the property. 3. The High Court held that the appellant was entitled to evict the respondent on the ground of breach of the implied condition of tenancy, even though she had not specifically pleaded this ground in her pleadings.

Final Decision: The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court, and restored those of the trial court. The defendant was ordered to vacate the house within a month.

Judgment

Shambhu Prasad Singh, J.

1. This second appeal by the plaintiff arises out of a suit for eviction of the defendant-respondent from a house on holding No. 140, Ward No. 9 in the city of Patria. The eviction was claimed on the grounds of personal necessity, sub-letting of the rooms of the house by the respondent to persons suffering from diseases like tuberculosis and cancer and denial of the appellants title by the respondent.

2. The defence was that the appellant had no personal necessity for the house, the house was never sub-let to persons suffering from diseases or anyone there was no denial of the appellants title by the respondent. A plea was also taken that no valid notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act was given to the respondent,

3. The trial Court found that a valid notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served on the respondent, there was no denial of the appellants till by the respondent and the appellant had no personal necessity for the house. It, however, found that the respondent had sub-let rooms of the house to persons suffering from diseases and decreed the suit. On appeal, the lower appellate Court confirmed the findings of the trial Court on the questions of notice, denial of title and personal necessity. It reversed the finding of the trial Court on the question of sub-letting and allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.

4. The appeal was taken up for hearing in December, 1970. Mr. S.C. Ghose for the appellant did not challenge the findings of the Courts below on the question of denial of title. lie, however, contended that the concurrent findings, of the Courts below on the question of personal necessity and that of the lower appellate Court on the question of sub-letting were wrong in law. According to him, the Courts below should have, on the facts found by them, held that the appellant had personal necessity for the house and the respondent had sub-let the house. The trial Court accepted the evidence of the plaintiffs witnesses that the respondent was allowing persons, not members of his family or relatives, suffering from diseases to stay in the rooms of the house for their treatment. This, in the opinion of the trial Court, amounted to sub-letting. The lower appellate Court did not record an unambiguous finding whether the evidence of the plaintiffs witnesses on this question could be accepted or not. After having discussed their evidence, it observed that there was no conclusive evidence on the records to substantiate the plaintiffs allegations regarding sub-letting. It was considered necessary for the purpose of decision of the appeal to have an unambiguous finding on the question whether the respondent was allowing persons suffering from diseases like tuberculosis and cancer to stay in the house. Accordingly, by order dated the 18th December, 1970, the Court of appeal below was directed to record a definite finding, on the aforesaid question after hearing the parties. It has submitted its finding that the defendant (respondent before this Court) was allowing persons suffering from diseases like tuberculosis and cancer to live in the house.

5. At the time of hearing of the appeal after receipt of the finding, Mr. Kailash Roy appearing for the respondent attempted to challenge the finding on the ground that it was based on Exts. 13 and 13 (a) which were inadmissible. He further submitted that even the oral evidence of the witnesses was nothing but an opinion formed by them and, therefore, inadmissible. The Court of appeal below has observed that even excluding Exts. 13 and 13 (a) from consideration, it would have recorded the same finding on other evidence. Therefore, the question whether these documents are admissible or not in evidence is not very material. I am not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Roy that the oral evidence of the witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff is nothing but an opinion and, therefore, inadmissible. The finding rec








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