PATNA HIGH COURT
S.Sarwar Ali, J.
Mohammad Gulam Rabbani
Versus
Bankipore Hari Sabha
Civil Revision No. 225 of 1973 ;
Decided On : MAY 03, 1973
Where the application complaining obstruction by the judgment debtor was filed one year after the date of obstruction and the executing court entertained the application after condoning the delay in exercise of its inherent powers.
Held that, where there is a specific provision in the Limitation Act, prescribing the period of limitation that period cannot be got over by resorting to the powers under Section 151 C.P.C.
Held further, that the Court below acted with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction in holding that the petition filed by the decree holder was maintainable.
(Paras 4 & 8)
II. Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908)-Order 21 R 97 (3) (Patna Amendment), General Clauses Act (Act 2 of 1887) and Section 5 Limitation Act (Act 36 of 1263-Order 21 R.97 (3) (Patna amendment) whether a legislation by incorporation-Section 5 of the New Limitation Act whether applied to applications under Order 21 C.P.C.-Delay in filing the application alleging obstruction, whether can be condoned.
Held that, where there is legislation by incorporation, the repeal of the first statue does not affect the section, as the incorporated provisions become part of the second Statue. In view of Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, a reference to section 5 of the Limitation Act in sub-rule 3 of Order 21 Rule 97 would be construed as a reference to the corresponding provision of the re-enacted Limitation Act, Section 5 of the re-enacted Limitation Act however excludes its application to application under Order 21. The delay in filing the application therefore cannot be condoned under Order 21 Rule 97 (3).
(Para 4 & 5)
S.Sarwar Ali, J.
1. This application in revision is directed against the order of the Court below holding that the petition filed by the opposite party on 13-7-72 under Order 21, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure is maintainable. It may be stated that there is no dispute that the alleged obstruction had taken place in July. 1971, nearly one year before the filing of the application dated the 13th July, 1972. The court below has held that although the application aforesaid is barred by time under Article 129 of the Indian Limitation Act, the said application is nevertheless maintainable as the Court has power to condone the delay under Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
2. The opposite party obtained a decree against opposite party No. 2 for his eviction from the shop premises. The decree was being executed. When the Nazir of the Civil Court went to deliver possession there was obstruction by the petitioner. The Nazir, therefore, reported the matter to the court on the 18th of July. 1971. In the report he stated that the delivery of possession could not be effected as there was no order to break open the lock. He also sought direction from the Court. It will be necessary to give some further facts but not at this stage as I propose to deal with some legal aspects first. I will refer to the relevant facts later.
3. So far as the petition dated the 13th of July. 1972 is concerned it cannot be disputed that the application has been filed beyond the period prescribed in Article 129 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 . The question, therefore, is whether the court has power to condone the delay in filing of the application under Order 21, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure under any provision of the Limitation Act, Civil Procedure Code or the inherent powers."
4. The court has condoned the delay in exercise of its inherent power. This in my view was clearly not permissible in law. There is specific provision in the Limitation Act prescribing the period of limitation and that period cannot be got over by resorting to the power under Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Court below has not correctly appreciated the scope of power under Sec.151 nor has he correctly appreciated the ratio of decision in the case of State of West Bengal V/s. Administrator Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 referred to in his order. It may be stated that learned counsel for the opposite party (who shall be hereinafter referred to as the decree-holder) did not support the view taken by the Court below. He however, contended that the court has power to condone the period of limitation under Order 21, Rule 97 (3). This contention I propose to notice in the next paragraph.
5. The sub-rule aforesaid is as follows:-
-
"the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. 1908, shall apply to applications under this Rule". (This sub-rule has been introduced by Patna High Court amendment).
Indian Limitation Act, 1908 has been repealed. In order to find out the effect of the repeal reference may be made to Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 8 aforesaid is as follows:-
-
"(1) Where the Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals and re-enacts with or without modification, any provision of a former enactment, then references in, any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall unless a different intention appears be construed as reference to the provision so re-enacted."
(2) Where before the fifteenth day of August, 1947 any Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom repealed and re-enacted with or without modification any provision of a former enactment, then references in any Central Act or in any Regulation or instrument to the provision so repealed shall unless a different intention appears, be construed as reference to the provision so re-enacted."
The result, therefore, is that reference to Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act in Sub-rule (3) of
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