1. This second appeal arises out of a suit for a declaration of a right of easement over certain lands and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the exercise of the said right.

2. The plaintiffs case, shortly stated, is as follows. The first plaintiff had purchased in the year 1944 the lands of plot No. 622 of mauza Daulatpur Abdul Chak which is situated south of a road going from Jehanabad to Arwal. In between the road and the aforesaid plot there are the Chant lands of the road and plot No. 622 which was purchased by the defendants in the year 1959 from one Hari Prasad Khetan, a relation of the first plaintiffs husband Murlidhar Khetan. The said plaintiffs husband Murlidhar had founded a high school which was situated at another place in the town of Jehanabad. The school could not get recognition owing to lack of accommodation. The first plaintiff, therefore, made her plot available for the construction of a building for the school. The construction was taken up and it had proceeded to chest height. In order to facilitate the construction of the school Hari Prasad Khetan had granted permission for taking of bricks and other materials by men and bullock-carts from the road to the site in plot No. 622 through his own plot 624. The width of such a passage was 18 feet east to west. The house of defendants 4 to 6 is situated on the eastern side of the said passage while defendants 1 to 3 are the purchasers of the land in the western side of the said Rasta. It is said that while the construction of the school building was in progress the defendants began to raise objection to the use of the aforesaid passage and they also wanted to construct a wall in order to close the passage. As a result there was a proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is further said that there is no passage from Arwal Road leading to the school and hence the plaintiffs have acquired the right of easement of necessity over the disputed lands of plot 624 and that the defendants have no right to interfere in the exercise of the aforesaid right. Hence the suit.

3. Defendant No. 2 who contested the suit alleged that he and the third defendant had purchased 9 decimals of land of plot No. 624. According to them, the construction in plot 622 had gone upto the waist height only but was stopped by the plaintiffs themselves for reasons best known to them. They also said that the plot of the plaintiffs can be reached through ridges of other fields and through a Pind connecting the road to the plot. It has also been denied that Hari Prasad had allowed any right of passage or that the plaintiffs had ever exercised any right of passage.

4. The trial court found that the right of passage had been allowed through the disputed land for going to the school from Arwal Road and that the passages through ridges or the pind could not be called passages and in any case were not convenient passages. But it held that there was no easement of necessity as the two tenements belonged to two different persons. He, however, held that the right of the plaintiffs was that of a licensee and Hari Prasad having permitted the use of the land as a passage in view of Sec. 60 (6) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (hereinafter called the Act) the defendants could not revoke the licence. In this view of the matter he decreed the plaintiffs suit. The lower appellate Court also concurred with the findings of the trial Court. Hence this appeal.

5. Mr. J. C. Sinha appearing for the appellant contended firstly that there could not be any easement of necessity in a case like the present one and that the aforesaid claim haying failed the suit should have been dismissed. On behalf of the respondents, however, it was urged that the courts below did not decree the suit on the ground of there being a right of easement but on the ground that the licence granted to the plaintiffs could not be revoked. Mr. J. C. Sinha in reply contended that t