1. The husband and the wife were married in the year 1966. In the year 1971, a male child was born. It appears that the wife, who is opposite party in the case, does not find the continuance of marital tie possible. She has filed a suit being Title Suit No. 5 of 1973 in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner at Ranchi for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty. She has also prayed for custody of the child.

2. According to the case of the petitioner, a few years after the solemnisation of the marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 , there was another ceremony of the marriage according to Hindu rites. This was in the year 1970. In this case, it will not be necessary to consider as to whether this was factually so, as, in my view, the rights of the parties, so far as the present suit is concerned, will be governed by the Special Marriage Act.

3. The suit has been transferred by the Judicial Commissioner to Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi. Before him, a question was raised as to whether he had jurisdiction to try the suit. In the impugned order, the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner has held that he has such a jurisdiction.

4. Mr. J. C. Sinha, appearing for the petitioner, contended that the Additional Judicial Commissioner has no such jurisdiction to try the suit. He relied on the definition of "District Court in Sec.2 (e), as also on Sections 23 and 31 of the Special Marriage Act. Sec.2 (e) of the Act aforesaid defines "District Court" as the principal Civil Court of Original jurisdiction. Sec.23 requires presentation of an application for judicial separation before the District Court. It further envisages that the Court, in the circumstances mentioned in the section, may decree judicial separation. Sec.31 states that such an application may be presented to the District Court within local limits of whose jurisdiction the marriage was solemnised or the husband and wife reside or last resided together. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kuldip Singh V/s. State of Punjab, (AIR 1956 SC 391), learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Court of the Additional Judicial Commissioner was a separate and distinct Court of its own and that it did not have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of the judicial Commissioner. He also relied on the decision in the case of Janak Dulari V/s. Narain Dass, (AIR 1959 Punj 50). It was next contended that Sec.23 aforesaid not only envisages presentation of an application for judicial separation to the District Court as defined in the Special Marriage Act but also requires disposal thereof by the District Court. It was, therefore, contended that disposal of the case by a court other than the District Court is not envisaged. Consequently, the Additional Judicial Commissioner had no jurisdiction to try the suit in question. Learned counsel further contended that the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") cannot be of any help to the petitioner. According to him, the Special Marriage Act, being a special Act, would prevail.

5. Mr. R. S. Chatterji, appearing for the opposite party, placed reliance on Section 8 of the Act and has contended that, by virtue of the provisions thereof, once the case has been transferred to the Court of the Additional Judicial Commissioner by the Judicial Commissioner, the said Court would be competent to try, and have jurisdiction to decide, the suit. He too relied on Kuldip Singhs case (supra). Reliance was also placed on the case of Mt. Daho Kuer V/s. Mt. Tural Devi, (AIR 1924 Pat 593) and Laxman Singh V/s. Kesharbai, (AIR 1966 Madh Pra 166), apart from the cases referred to in the decision of the Court below. It was further contended that, by virtue of Sec. 40 of the Special Marriage Act, Sec.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applicable to a proceeding under the Special Marriage Act. Some other contentions were also raised which need not be noticed in the view that I am t