1. In this second appeal by the defendant, a very interesting question has been raised for my consideration.

2. The plaintiffs instituted a title suit for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises bearing Holding No. 154, Circle No. 102, Ward No. 26 of the Patna Municipal Corporation on the ground that he was a defaulter within the meaning of clause (d) of Sec.11 (1) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the andapos;Actandapos;), having failed to pay rent for two months, namely, Shrawan and Bhado 1369 Fasli. Admittedly, the tenancy in question is governed by the Hindi (Fasli) calendar. The defendant resisted the suit on the ground that he was not a defaulter in the eye of law, having remitted the rent for the two months in question by money order within the stipulated period.

3. The plaintiffs had instituted earlier Title Suit No. 332 of 1962 in the trial Court for the same relief and the same cause of action against the defendant. In that suit, the plaintiffs had obtained an order under Sec.11-A of the Act for deposit of the arrears of rent, including rent for the months of Shrawan and Bhado 1369 Fasli, which was deposited by the defendant under the said provision, and I am informed at the Bar that the plaintiffs withdrew the same. The months of Shrawan, Bhado and Aswin in the Fasli year 1369 commenced on the 18th of July, 16th of August and 15th of September and ended on the 15th August, 14th September and 13th October 1962 respectively. The earlier title suit instituted on the 27th September 1962 was, therefore, premature, as the period of one month after Bhado 1369 Fasli, during which period the tenant could have made the payment of the rent of that month, had not passed out, nor the plaintiffs had determined the tenancy in question by serving a notice of termination under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Accordingly, on 23-6-1965, a petition was filed on behalf of the plaintiffs seeking permission of the Court to withdraw the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The defendant did not object to this prayer and, accordingly, the suit was permitted to be withdrawn with an express permission to institute a fresh suit.

4. The plaintiffs thereafter determined the tenancy by serving a notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act on the defendant and have instituted the present suit for his eviction from the suit premises on the ground that he was a defaulter, having defaulted to make payment of the rent for two months aforesaid. It is not denied that the tenant had remitted the rent for the aforesaid two months on 19-10-1962 by money order, which was refused by the plaintiffs. Both the Courts below have concurrently held that the defendant was a defaulter within the meaning of Sec.11 (1) (d) of the Act, and, as such, was liable to be evicted.

5. In this Court, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the remittance of rent by the defendant on 19-10-1962 was well within the time allowed to him under the law and, therefore, no decree for eviction could be passed. In support of his contention, counsel relied on the definition of the term `monthandapos; appearing in the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act as well as in the Central General Clauses Act to the effect that a month would mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar. He also referred to Sec.24 of the new Limitation Act, according to which computation of time mentioned in any instrument for the purpose of computing the period of limitation is to be made with reference to the Gregorian calendar, and contended that in this case, the tenancy month of Bhado ending on the 14th September, 1962, the appellant was entitled to the whole of one full month following the month of September 1962 for making the payment of rent for the month of Bhado 1369 Fasli; and inasmuch as the rent had already been remitted by money order on 19-10