A person continuing in possession after the termination of tenancy in his favour is included in the definition of tenant and is liable to pay rent.

S.ALI AHMAD, J.

1. After this appeal was heard, we were informed that similar questions are involved in Second Appeal No. 231 of 1975. Learned counsel appearing in this appeal and Second Appeal No. 231 of 1975, therefore, prayed that the judgement in this appeal may not be delivered before the hearing of Second Appeal No. 231 of 1975 was concluded. We, therefore, directed Second Appeal No. 231 of 1975 to be listed along with this appeal for hearing. Learned counsel appearing in both these two appeals addressed us on the points involved in the cases. Only one point is common to the two appeals. The facts are also entirely different. It is, therefore, desirable to give separate judgements in the two appeals.

2. According to the plaintiff-respondents, they purchased the house from the admitted last owner under a registered sale deed dated 14-5-1956 executed in their favour. At the time of sale, the defendant-appellant was occupying the suit premises as a tenant on a monthly rental of Rs. 25. The defendant-appellant in the demised room was carrying on business under the name and style of Rashtriya Pustak Bhandar. The defendant did not pay a single paisa as rent after the purchase without recourse to the suit. The rent from Oct, 1964, till April 1967 had fallen due at the rate of Rs. 25 per month, totalling to Rs. 775. He was a defaulter under S.11(1)(d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be called the Act). By virtue of this default he rendered himself liable to be evicted under S.11(1)(d) of the Act. It is further said that the plaintiffs also required the house for their own occupation and also for the extension of their business of sweetmeat. This requirement, according to them, was bona fide which entitled them to get a decree for eviction on that count also. The plaintiff-respondents claim that they requested the appellant to pay the arrears and vacate the premises but it did not bear any fruit. In the circumstance, they say that they were obliged to send a notice under S.106 of the T.P. Act on 2-11-1964 to the defendant-appellant asking him to pay the arrears of rent and to give vacant possession on the 1st Dec. 1964. This notice was sent by registered post and was received by the defendant on the 14th Nov. 1964. It is said that in spite of this notice the defendant-appellant neither paid arrears of rent nor vacated the house. The plaintiffs, therefore, were obliged to file this suit for recovery of Rs. 775 being arrears of rent and for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises.

3. The defendant in his written statement did not deny the title of the plaintiffs. Their case, however, is that the plaintiffs never informed him about the purchase for some months and, therefore, he did not know that the rent had to be paid to the plaintiffs. The allegation that the defendant was in the habit of not paying rent without recourse to the suit was also denied. It has been said that in the year 1936 he sent Rs. 70 covering rent for two months by money order but the same was refused and the money order was returned. It is also said that on the assurance of the plaintiffs he paid Rs. 165-8-3 to the Electric Supply Company and also paid Rs. 34-7-9 on 1-2-1967 for restoration of electric connection. These two amounts, according to the defendant, are to be adjusted towards rent. Further according to the defendants case the plaintiffs had earlier instituted Title Suit No. 228 of 1956 in the court of the Munsif on 21-12-1956 for eviction. This suit was decreed by the trial court against which an appeal, being Title Appeal No. 171 of 1960 was preferred to the District Judge, Muzaffarpur. On the order of the appellate court, the defendant, it is said, deposited Rs. 1,500 towards rent in the appellate court. Ultimately the appeal was allowed and the case was remanded to the trial court for disposal in accordance with law. But the suit was withdrawn by the plaintiffs on 31-1-1966. It