UDAY SINHA, J.

1. These three applications have been heard together and will be governed by this common judgement. When does "inquiry" in a proceeding under Sec.107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) commence ? That is the point falling for consideration in these three applications. The commencement of Inquiry in a proceeding under Sec. 107 of the Code has assumed importance under the new Code, as Sec.116(6) has determined the life of a proceeding as six months from the commencement of the inquiry.

2. These three applications have been placed before the Special Bench in view of an apparent conflict of views in two Division Bench decisions of this Court, Considering the importance of the question involved H.L. Agrawal and P.S. Sahay, JJ. directed that the matter be considered and set at rest by a larger Bench. That is how these cases are before this Full Bench.

3. The facts in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 2724 of 1975 are that a proceeding under Sec.107 of the Code was initiated against the petitioner on 13-6-1974. They appeared in court in answer to notice on 24-7-1974 and prayed for time to show cause. Before the petitioners could show cause, on 14-9-1974 the learned Magistrate directed the petitioners to show cause against execution of ad interim bonds to keep the peace. The petitioners showed cause in the main proceeding on 29-10-1974. It appears that the proceeding dragged on for some months. On 11-2-1975 the learned Magistrate directed the first party (opposite party No. 2) to produce his witnesses in support of the allegations. On 12-5-1975 while the main proceeding was pending, the learned Magistrate directed the petitioners (second party) to execute ad interim bonds to keep the peace in terms of Sec.116(3) of the new Code. On 16-6-1975 the petitioners filed an application before the learned Magistrate to drop the proceeding, as six months had already expired without coming to a conclusion. That prayer of the petitioners was rejected by the learned Magistrate. Thereafter, they filed the present application for quashing the entire proceeding.

4. In Criminal Miscellaneous No. 403 of 1976 also the petitioners had been called upon to execute ad interim bonds. The proceeding under Sec.107 of the Code had been initiated on 14-3-1975 and had not -come to a conclusion till 2-1-1976. On 1-2-1976 the petitioners of this application moved this Court for quashing the proceeding, as according to them, it had lapsed by efflux of six months from the date of commencement of the proceeding. In this application the petitioners were the second party to the proceeding and Shyam Singh, the Opposite party was the first parts. The opposite party of this application and some others are petitioners iii Criminal Revision No. 69 of 1976. Both the parties having been called upon to execute ad interim bonds, they have moved this Court for quashing the proceedings against them on the same ground, namely, lapse of the proceeding by efflux of time.

5. Sec.116 of the new Code with some alterations is equivalent to Sec.117(3) of the old Code. Sec. 116(5) provides the span of life of a proceeding under Sec.107 of the Code. It laps down that an inquiry under Sec.116 shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of commencement and if not completed it shall stand terminated unless directed otherwise by a Magistrate and that too for special reasons. The Code itself is silent in regard to the point of time at which inquiry into a proceeding under Sec.107 of the Code must be deemed to have commenced. The expression "commencement of the inquiry" finds place in Sec. 116(3). In order to appreciate the point at which an inquiry under Sec.107 of the Code commences. it will be useful to recapitulate the course a proceeding takes. When a Magistrate is satisfied that breach of the peace is apprehended, he shall record his satisfaction and order issuance of notice to the person proceeded against to show cause