Lalit Mohan Sharma, J.

1. The plaintiff petitioner filed a suit for money on the allegation that the defendant, as karta of his joint family, had taken a loan of Rs.2190 from him on the basis of a promissory note. The defendant denied the liability and also pleaded that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of section 7 (5) of the Bihar money Lenders Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). Both the Courts have examined the evicence led in the case and have concurrently held that the plaintiffs claim on merits is correct and the defendant is liable for the amount mentioned in the promissory note with interest at Re.1 per centum per mensem. They have, however, accepted the defence that the suit is hit by the provisions of Sec.7 (5) of the Act, and since the relevant extract from a register enjoined by the Act to be maintained has not been produced in the suit, the claim cannot be decreed. The suit has been accordingly dismissed. Since the total claim in the suit is less than rs.3,000, a second appeal is barred under sec.102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the plaintiff has, therefore, filed the present application in revision challenging the decision of the courts below.

2. Mr. Kailash Roy, appearing in support of this application, has contended that since the suit was filed in the year 1973, that is, before the enactment of the Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1974 , and the provisions of the Act are not retrospective in operation, Sec.7 (5) of the act has no application to the present suit whatsoever. It is, therefore, suggested that in view of the concurrent findings of fact in favour of the plaintiff, which is binding on the High Court, the suit is fit to be decreed.

3. The defendant has not appeared in this case but Mr. Parmeshwar Prasad sinha, learned Advocate through whom the defendant in a similar suit has filed a second appeal which has been numbered as S. A.52 of 1979 has intervened and has assisted the Court by his argument presenting the opposite point of view.

4. The only question which arises for decision in this case is as to whether the provisions of Sec.7 (5) of the act are applicable to a suit filed earlier than the coming in force of the Act.

5. It is a fully established rule that statutes should be, as far as it may be possible, interpreted so as to respect the vestedrights. For the purpose of affecting such rights, the language of the statute must be in express and unambiguous term to that effect. (Sec Craies on Statute law, 7th edition, 398 ). The supreme Court in Eapen Chacko V/s. The Provident Investment Company (p) Ltd. (1977)1 SCR 1026, while recognising this rule observed that for the purpose of interpreting a subsequent law, former state of law is to be construed as also the legislative changes contemplated by the statute and where the effect could be to alter a transaction, already entered into, prima facie construction of the Act is that it is not to be retrospective. The decisions in Moon V/s. Durden (1948) 2 exth 22 ; Gardner V/s. Lucas (1978) 3 appeal Cases 582 ; and Smithies V/s. National union of Operative Plasters (1909) 1 kb 310 were followed. In Moon V/s. Durden, a question arose as to whether sec.18 of the Gaming Act, 1845 providing that no suit should be brought or maintained for recovering any sum of money alleged to have been won upon a wager, applied to a suit instituted earlier. The observations of Parke, J while deciding the point in the negative, have been quoted by the Supreme court with approval. In Smithies V/s. National union oj Operative plasters. (supra) the plaintiff had commenced an action before the passing of the Trade Disputes act, 1906 for damages against a trade union for procuring a continuing breach of contract by the workmen, by sanctioning a strike by them and giving them strike pay. The Sec.4 of the 1906 Act raised a bar to such actions and the argument was that since the enactment was not retrospective in express terms, it could not a