The proviso to Section 11(1)(c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 mandates the court to consider whether partial eviction of the tenant would be appropriate in a case where the landlord's reasonable requirement could be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part of the premises only.

1. This is defendants second appeal against the judgment of reversal passed by the learned Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Bhagalpur, in an appeal arising from a suit for eviction filed by the two brothers, who are respondents.

2. The suit for eviction was filed by the respondents as plaintiffs on the ground of personal necessity, namely that they required tenanted shop in occupation of the appellant for their personal requirement and business, as also for the three sons of respondent Basir Ahmad, who are all grown-up. The disputed rented premises in which the appellant runs a cloth shop exists on the main Sujaganj Bazar Road leading to Bhagalpur Railway station, and passing through one of the main markets of the town of Bhagalpur. The respondent run a business in watches by the name and style of the National Watch Company in a small rented shop, having undisputedly only a frontage of 4 to 5 cubits in breadth. Certain purchases were made by the plaintiffs in the year 1963. The lands purchased are near the disputed shop. They have no frontage towards the main Sujaganj road. In a portion of this purchased land the plaintiffs also run a business of watches, locally called as National Gift House. Several agencies of sewing machine and other articles were also obtained by them. For expansion of their business, particularly with a view to provide occupation to the three sons of respondent Basir Ahmad, the plaintiffs, on refusal of the defendant to vacate the suit premises, filed the instant suit for eviction, which was resisted by the appellant.

3. The trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs on the ground that the plaintiffs had not succeeded in establishing personal necessity.

4. The respondent took up the matter in appeal. The lower appellate Court held that the respondents required the suit holding reasonably and in good faith for their personal necessity and consequently after setting aside the judgment of the trial Court, it decreed the plaintiffs suit for eviction from the entire disputed premises, which has given rise to this second appeal at the instance of the defendant.

5. Two substantial questions of law were formulated by the learned single Judge of this Court while admitting this second appeal. They are mentioned in order No. 11 dated 5-1-1980. The first is whether the evidence led by the plaintiffs is sufficient in law to establish personal necessity within the meaning of the Bihar (Rent) Control Act? The second is whether the lower appellate Court was under the duty to examine the question if the necessity of the plaintiffs can be satisfied by a partial decree in the present case?

6. The submission of Mr. S.C. Ghose, learned counsel for the appellant, was twofold. His first submission was that on the materials on record the finding of the lower appellate Court about the suit holding being required by the plaintiffs reasonably and in good faith for their personal necessity was wrong and should be set aside. The second submission was on the lines as indicated in point No. 2 formulated at the time of admission of the appeal. Learned counsel for the respondents refuted the contentions raised by Mr. Ghose.

7. The lower appellate Court held categorically that the plaintiffs required suit holding reasonably and in good faith for their personal necessity. This is a finding of fact. A finding of fact duly recorded by the lower appellate Court in accordance with law is binding on this Court. It is true that this finding recorded by the lower appellate Court is contrary to the finding recorded by the trial Court but on the materials on record the trial Court appears to be in error in arriving at this finding.

8. The submission of Mr. Ghose was that this finding suffered from certain infirmities, which, according to Mr. Ghose, vitiated the judgment of the lower appellate Court. The main plea taken by the plaintiffs was personal necessity for expansion of the business. The trial Court observed in its judgment