1. This application in revision is at the instance of the plaintiffs whose plaint in Title Suit No.3 of 1979, instituted for a declaration in respect of the deed of gift as being void and fraudulent, etc., has been rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge by applying Sec. 4(b) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act") on the ground that, by virtue of the aforesaid provision the suit was not maintainable.

2. The Stamp Reporter had raised objection to the maintainability of this application under Sec.115 of the Civil P.C. in view of the definition of the term decree in Sec.2 (2) read with Order VII. Rule 11(d) of the Civil P.C. The question of maintainability was left open to be urged at the time of the final hearing of the application by the learned Judge admitting this application. Accordingly, when this application came up for hearing before a learned single Judge of this Court, he referred this case to a Division Bench and it is how it is placed before us.

3. The question of jurisdiction or maintainability of this application arises in this way that, if it is held that the impugned order was appealable then obviously that lay before the lower appellate Court and the present application in revision would be barred as provided under Sec.115 (i) of the Code. In order to appreciate the question falling for our consideration it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Civil P.C. and the Act. Sec. 4 of the Act deals with the effects of the notification under Sec.3 (i) and contemplates various consequences and one of the consequences is contemplated under clause (b) which reads as follows:-

"(b) No suit or other legal proceeding, in respect of any land in such areas shall be entertained in any Court, and in calculating period of limitation applicable to such suits and proceedings such period shall not be counted: Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to any proceeding under Sec. 48(E) of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 (Act 8 of 1885) and to the proceedings relating to recording the titles of Batiadars."

Sec.37 of the Act also may be seen which creates a bar that no Civil Courts shall entertain any suit or application to vary or set aside any decision or order given or passed under this Act with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act. On the facts of the present case, however, we are not concerned with the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court as provided under Sec.37 of the Act and, therefore, a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Narendra Kumar Verma V/s. State of Bihar, (1980 BBCJ (HC) 252), which has considered the scope and the implication of the bar under S.37 of the Act, is not applicable to this case. We, therefore, need not discuss this authority in detail.

4. Order VII, Rule 11 of the Civil P.C. contemplates various circumstances under which a plaint has to be rejected by the Court and one of the circumstances is mentioned in clause (d) with which we are concerned in this case which reads as follows:-

"Where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law." This, at once, brings us to the defintion of the term decree, i.e. to the definition section, namely, Sec.2(2), which includes "rejection of the plaint and determination of any question within Sec.144" within its fold.

4A. It is therefore, obvious that an order rejecting the plaint has got to be treated as a decree and it will be subject to all those consequences applicable to a decree of the Civil Court, one of them being a right of appeal under S.96. From the above provisions, it is quite apparent and obvious to us that the order under revision rejecting the plaint amounted to a decree within the meaning of Sec.2 (2) of the Code and, therefore, was an appealable order and inasmuch as the valuation of the suit is less than rupees ten thousand, an appe