Hari Lal Agarwal, J.

1. The petitioner, who is member of the second party to a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) has filed this application against the order, dated 2nd May, 1979 passed by the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, West Muzaffarpur, whereby he ordered attachment of the land! in dispute on the ground that there was sufficient tention (Kofi Tanav) between the parties and on that account, apprehension of breach of the peace. It has further been observed in the said order that to come to a decision as to which of the parties was in possession of the disputed land, was bound to take certain time on account of the legal difficulties,

2. The order has been impugned by the petitioner on the ground that inasmuch as the facts stated in the order of attachment did not disclose any case of emergency the order of attachment was bad in law.

3. The proceeding in question was initiated on 27-11-1978 on a police report with respect to 1 acre 36 decimals of land. Written statement were filed by both the parties and then on 2-1-1979 the members of the first party filed a petition before the learned Magistrate alleging therein that the member of the second party inadvertently mentioned in the petition as members of the first party with a view to create unnecessary and illegal disturbance over the disputed land had started executing forged and fabricated documents with respect to the disputed land in order to set up other persons "to create uncalled for troubles over the disputed land leading to a serious apprehension of breach of peace in peadeacy of the present proceeding." On these allegations it was further alleged that an emergency existed, as breach of the peace had become imminent at the hands of the second party and their associates. Although the impugned order does not mention in any particular details, the materials, on which the learned Magistrate placed reliance in passing the order of attachment the order atleast says this much that he looked into the written statement and heard both the parties. It seems, therefore, quite natural that members of the first party must have pressed the above petition in the circumstances alleged therein, which prevailed upon the learned Magistrate to pass the order of attachment.

4. When the case was placed earlier before a learned single judge of this Court for hearing, he referred the case to a Division Bench, as in his opinion, the question involved interpretation of two Supreme Court decisions. Although reference of the cases is not given; as informed at the Bar, those two cases of the Supreme Court are Chandu Naik and Ors. V/s. Sitaram B. Naik and Anr. and Mathwalal V/s. Bkanwarilal and Anr. -- . Having given my anxious consideration to both the cases and hearing learned Counsel for both the parties, there does hot appear to be such difficulty in understanding the ratio of either of the cases. The principle that flows from the above cases is that Sections 145 and 146 of the Code together constitute a scheme for the resolution of a situation where there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace and that Sec.146 should not be separated from Sec.145 and it can only be read in he context of Sec.145 otherwise it may, be misleaded. It has been very clearly observed that in a case of emergency, a Magistrate may attach the property, at any time after making the preliminary order under Sec.145(1). The argument that after the order of attachment of the property the jurisdiction of the Magistrate ends, was repelled and it was laid down that the Magistrates jurisdiction does not end as soon as an attachment is made on the ground of emergency and that there was no departure from the provisions contained in the old Code of Criminal Procedure and that the possession of Sections 145 and 146 of the 1973 Code upon substantially this man is the corresponding provision by the 1955 amendment of the old Code.

5. From discussion of the ab