1. The defendants are the petitioners here. They are aggrieved by the order of the learned Munsif dated the 6th Aug. 1981, by which an amendment in the plaint sought by the plaintiff-opposite party has been allowed.

2. The opposite party filed a title suit, being Title Suit No.102 of 1971 in the Court of the Munsif IV, Chapra, for a decree for specific performance of contract in his favour and for a declaration that the sale deed dated 16-10-1969 in favour of defendants 3 to 5 is illegal, void and ineffective. The suit after filing of the written statement and framing of the issues was taken up for hearing, evidence being led by both the sides, after the close of which arguments were heard. During the course of argument the petitioners counsel submitted that there has been violation of S.16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and, therefore, the suit is fit to be dismissed. According to petitioners counsel, the plaintiff-opposite party has failed to aver and prove that he was all along ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him. On this submission being made an application was filed for amendment of the plaint which was allowed by the impugned order. The amendment sought for in paragraph 10 of the plaint is as follows :-

3. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that by the allowing of this amendment they have been deprived of a valuable right as the suit itself is liable to fail without this amendment and this amendment really creates a right that is barred by limitation. According to the learned counsel for the plaintiff-opposite party no new case is being added, and the amendment sought is purely technical in nature which fact has been stated by P.W.1 in his evidence in paragraph 4 of his deposition at the very beginning and on this point there was no cross-examination on behalf of the defendants-petitioners.

4. The decision of this case rests entirely on the interpretation of the two decisions, one of the Supreme Court and the other of the Allahabad High Court, which have settled down the law with respect to the effect of the absence of an averment that the plaintiff is ready to fulfil the essential terms of the contract, in the plaint and its effect which can or cannot be cured by amendment of the plaint. In this connection I would first cite the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ganesh Trading Co. V/s. Moji Ram (AIR 1978 SC 484), paragraphs 2 and 5 of which are relevant, and they are usefully quoted below :-

"2. Procedural law is intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course of substantive justice. Provisions relating to pleadings in civil cases are meant to give to each side intimation of the case of the other so that it may be met, to enable courts to determine what is really at issue between parties and to prevent deviations from the course which litigation on particular causes of action must take.

5. It is true that, if a plaintiff seeks to alter the cause of action itself and to introduce indirectly through an amendment of his pleadings an entirely new or inconsistent cause of action, amounting virtually to the substitution of a new plaint or a new cause of action in place of what was originally there, the Court will refuse to permit it if it amounts to depriving the party against which a suit is pending of any right which may have accrued in its favour due to lapse of time. But, mere failure to set out even an essential fact does not by itself constitute a new cause of action. A cause of action is constituted by the whole bundle of essential facts which the plaintiff must prove before he can succeed in his suit. It must be antecedent to the institution of the suit. If any essential fact is lacking from averments in the plaint the cause of action will be defective. In that case, an attempt to supply the omission has been and could sometime be viewed as equivalent to an introduction of a new cause of action which, cured of its