Slurry is coal and, therefore, is a mineral specified under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. All minerals belong to the State and nobody can appropriate them except in accordance with law.

SATYESHWAR ROY, J.

1. According to the writ petition, the petitioner deals in slurry. He claims to have raiyati land in portions of plots Nos. 3658, 3659, 3680, 4448 and 3456 in village Dugda. There is a coal washery belonging to Bharat Coal Washery (hereinafter to be referred to as the coal washery). The affluent from the coal washery flows through rivulets and settles down in those plots. The petitioner collects the accumulated slurry and converts it into balls/briquettes. Those balls/briquettes are sold in the market as fuel. Slurry is not coal and Bihar Coal Control Order, 1956 (the Order) has no application to the business carried on by the petitioner. The respondents were illegally interfering with the business of the petitioner in slurry which he collects from the aforesaid plots. On these averments mainly, the petitioner prays for a declaration that the slurry is not coal within the meaning of the Order and the respondents be restrained from giving effect to that order and the Essential Commodities Act against the petitioner for dealing in slurry.

2. Counter affidavit has been filed by respondent No. 18 P. K. Agarwalla. In the counter affidavit, it was stated that plots Nos. 3658 and 3659 were Gair Majurwa. Portions of plots Nos. 4456, 4458 and 3659 were taken on lease by the petitioner but the lease was cancelled by the raiyat. The petitioner had no interest in any of the plots and no slurry accumulates in any of the plots. The slurry which comes out of the coal washery was "coal" and even if it accumulates in any raiyati plots, the same remained the property of the State of Bihar. The State of Bihar by a lease deed gave right to him to collect the slurry from plot Nos. 11 and 109 of village Dugda. Respondent No. 19 who was the transferee from respondent No. 18, inter alia, in its counter affidavit reiterated the averments made in the counter affidavit by respondent No. 18.

3. The hearing of the application was taken up on 29th March, 1984 and was heard in part. On 30th March, 1984, during the course of hearing, an application was filed on behalf of the petitioner for leave to amend the writ application. In this application, the petitioner inter alia stated that before the counsel for respondent No. 18 was heard, the validity of the lease deed executed in his favour by the State of Bihar on 4th of April, 1975, be decided as ordered by the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 5303 of 1981. The order passed by the Supreme Court related to a case in which the petitioner was not a party. In the facts and circumstances of the case, after we had heard Mr. Sahai Sinha learned counsel for the petitioner, we did not think it necessary to hear the counsel appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 18 and 19. No opinion, therefore, is necessary to be expressed in this case with regard to the lease deed executed by the State of Bihar in favour of respondent No. 18.

4. At the time of hearing when Mr. Sahai Sinha was questioned as to how the petitioner claimed interest in the plots in question, he referred to the statements made in paragraph 4 at page 8, paragraph 3 at page 50, paragraph 2 at page 156 paragraph 3 at page 182 and paragraphs 11 and 12 at page 252 of the brief. The relevant paragraphs in the counter affidavits are paragraphs 11 and 12 at page 98 and paragraph 13 at page 196 of the brief. He did not dispute the position that if it was held that the petitioner had no interest in the plots in question he was not entitled to any relief.

5. What is required to be decided in this case is, therefore, whether the petitioner has been able to show that he is a raiyat of or has any interest in the plots claimed by him and even if it is decided in his favour whether he has any legal right to collect slurry from the said plots?

6. From the perusal of the relevant paragraphs of the writ application with regard to the claim of the petitioner in the plots mentioned therein, it appears that at one place he claims