PATNA HIGH COURT
S.S.Sandhawalia and S.Shamsul Hasan JJ.
Baba Dai
Versus
Muneshwar Jha
Appeal From Appellate Decree No. 9 of 1976 ;
Decided On : AUGUST 28, 1984
SUITS VALUATION ACT - S.11 - JURISDICTION - APPEAL - LACK OF PECUNIARY JURISDICTION - OBJECTION - PREJUDICE - S.11 OF THE SUITS VALUATION ACT BARS AN OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION BASED ON OVER-VALUATION OR UNDER-VALUATION, UNLESS PREJUDICE IS CAUSED.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the first appellate Court to hear and dispose of the appeal, arguing that the admitted value of the property involved in the suit was Rs. 10,000.00, which was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the lack of pecuniary jurisdiction of the appellate Court could not be raised as a point of law without showing prejudice suffered by the appellant, as required by S.11 of the Suits Valuation Act.
Issues: Whether the first appellate Court had jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the appeal, given that the admitted value of the property involved in the suit was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in AIR 1954 SC 340, which held that S.11 of the Suits Valuation Act bars an objection to jurisdiction based on over-valuation or under-valuation, unless prejudice is caused. The Court also noted that the appellant had not raised any objection to the District Judge hearing the appeal and had not shown any prejudice suffered on merit.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed the appeal with costs, holding that the appellant had failed to show any prejudice suffered as a result of the lack of pecuniary jurisdiction of the appellate Court.
SYED SHAMSUL HASAN, J.
1. This is an appeal by the defendant in a suit for partition of the joint properties consisting of lands and for an allotment of separate areas on the basis of half share in the family properties. The lands are situated in village Chandol Barahi in the district of Saharsa. The suit was dismissed but the appeal by the plaintiffs was allowed leading to the present second appeal.
2. A very short question was raised in this appeal. It was contended by the appellant that the first appellate Court had no jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the appeal because the admitted value of the property involved in the suit was Rs. 10,000.00 and that was the value given in the plaint and the grounds of appeal in the lower appellate Court.
3. The matter was referred to a Division Bench by me in view of the fact that two decisions of this Court reported in AIR 1949 Pat 278 (FB) and AIR 1918 Pat 71 needed a deeper examination, in the light of the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that S.11A of the Suits Valuation Act does not apply as the valuation of the property in the suit was not increased. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on AIR 1918 Pat 71 to submit that if the value of the property in the suit and the appeal is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court concerned, the decree so passed, shall be void and no amount of consent or acquiescence will save the decree from the vice of nullity. The passage relied upon is as follows :-
"Where there is an inherent want of jurisdiction, the consent of parties cannot confer jurisdiction and objection can be taken any time. Where a Court has no inherent jurisdiction to try a case it cannot pronounce any decree and if it does pronounce a decree that decree is null and void".
In reply however a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in AIR 1949 Pat 278 is cited by the learned counsel for the respondents. After an elaborate discussion of all the aspects involved the Hon"ble Sinha, J. as he then was, came to the following conclusions :-
"In view of these considerations, I have come to the following conclusions : (1) That the judgment of the trial Court in this case was not vitiated by any error of jurisdiction as a result of the under valuation. (2) That the judgment of the lower appellate Court are not wholly void but only voidable on the appellants showing that they are erroneous in fact or in law, and that thus the appellants have been prejudiced in the disposal of the appeal on merits. (3) That simply because the lower appellate Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction over the appeal, which should have been heard as a first appeal, in this Court, would not by itself amount to prejudice in the disposal of the case on merits. (4) That the established practice of this Court to treat such a second appeal as the present as a first appeal for all purposes, including those of court fees, is not in accordance with the provisions of the Suits Valuation Act or the Court-fees Act. I would, therefore, answer the question under reference in the negative".
4. The second and third conclusions are relevant for the purpose of this application. Undoubtedly in view of these conclusions AIR 1918 Pat 71 stand impliedly overruled. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the aforesaid decision has no application to the facts of this case because in the instant case there is no doubt that the court hearing the appeal was not in doubt with the pecuniary jurisdiction in view of the admitted valuation of the property in suit. But in the case of Ramdeo Singh V/s. Raj Narain Singh, AIR 1949 Pat 278 the court trying the suit had jurisdiction to try the matter on the basis of the valuation given by the parties which was found later to be inadequate and had to be increased. In my view this distinction on facts does not affect that conclusions of law arrived at in the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in AIR 1949 Pat 278. I have no manner of doubt
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