A tenant cannot send rent in advance to the landlord by money order.

1. The suit giving rise to the above Second Appeal was filed by the plaintiff/respondent on July 9, 1968. It is governed by the provisions of law contained in the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act").

2. In his statement of claim, the plaintiff/respondent urged two grounds in support of the relief for the ejectment of the defendant/appellant. According to him, the defendant/appellant had defaulted in the payment of rent for the months of June and July, 1966. It was further alleged that the defendant/appellant was guilty of illegal subletting.

3. The defendant/appellant in his rejoinder to the statement of claim filed by the plaintiff/respondent, stated that he had not sublet the accommodation in dispute. It was further averred by him that he sent the rent for June and July, 1966, by money order to the plaintiff/respondent who refused to accept the same on July 16, 1966. It was common ground between the parties that the agreed rent payable by the defendant/appellant was Rs. 88/- per mensem.

4. Both the courts below have found against the plaintiff/respondent on the ground of subletting. The correctness of this finding recorded by the courts below has not been called in question on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent. The two courts have, however, differed on the question as to whether there was any default in payment of rent as contemplated by S.11(d) of the Act. The Munsif was of the view that the ground referred to in cl.(d) of S.11 of the Act was not made out. In this view of the matter, the Munsif dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent. The appellate court below has differed with the Munsif on this aspect of the case. According to the appellate court, the defendant/appellant was in arrears of rent for the months of June and July, 1966 and as such was liable to be evicted. The court of appeal below, accordingly, set aside the decree passed by the Munsif and decreed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent.

5. The controversy between the parties centres round a Money Order which is alleged to have been sent by the defendant/appellant to the plaintiff/respondent on July 4, 1966 which is said to have been refused by the plaintiff/respondent on July 16, 1966. No postal receipt of the Money order issued by the post Office has been filed in the case. The defendant/appellant only relied on Money Order coupon (Ext.B-23) with an endorsement by Jagdish Ram, postal peon, that the addressee of the Money Order had refused to accept the same. The said endorsement of refusal is Ext. C on the record.

6. At the time of the admission of this Second Appeal, certain substantial questions of law were formulated. The hearing of this Second Appeal commenced before me on Feb. 9, 1984. At the commencement of the hearing, I informed the counsel of the parties that another substantial question of law requires determination in this appeal. According to me, the question involved was whether the Money Order alleged to have been sent on July 4, 1966, could include the rent for July itself and whether the plaintiff/respondent was justified in refusing to accept the said Money order or not. In case the refusal of the Money Order on his part was justified, could the defendant/appellant escape the consequence provided for in S.11(d) of the Act. After conveying this information, I adjourned this Second Appeal for hearing to Feb. 10, 1984. The case was heard on the said date but the arguments could not be concluded and have continued till today (Feb. 11,1984).

7. The submissions of the learned counsel have covered a wide range. On behalf of the plaintiff/respondent, it has been urged that the findings recorded by the court of appeal below are findings of fact and cannot be called in question in Second Appeal. In reply to the said argument, it has been pressed upon me by the learned counsel for the defendant/ appellant that in arriving at the findings of fact, the court of appeal bel