PATNA HIGH COURT
S.S.Sandhawalia and B.P.Jha JJ.
Kishori Singh
Versus
State Of Bihar
Letter Patent Appeal No. 61 of 1982 ;
Decided On : APRIL 8, 1985
WRIT PETITION - WITHDRAWAL - SECOND PETITION - BAR - O.23 R.1 CIVIL P.C. - APPLICABILITY - ABUSE OF PROCESS - PREVENTION.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant had filed a writ petition challenging an impugned order, which was unconditionally withdrawn. He then filed a second writ petition on the same facts and cause of action. The single Judge dismissed the second petition on the ground that the appellant had already filed a writ petition and withdrawn the same.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the unconditional withdrawal of a writ petition would operate as a bar to the filing of a second petition on the same facts and in respect of the same cause of action. The court relied on O.23 R.1 Civil P.C. and the principle of prevention of abuse of process.
Issues: Whether the unconditional withdrawal of a writ petition would operate as a bar to the filing of a second petition on the same facts and in respect of the same cause of action.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the writ jurisdiction is discretionary and there is no vested right in a writ petitioner to secure the relief which he claims. The court also held that the provisions of O.23 R.1 Civil P.C. are applicable to writ petitions mutatis mutandis and that the principle of prevention of abuse of process requires that a second writ petition on the same facts and cause of action should not be entertained.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the single Judge.
S.S.SANDHAWALIA, J.
1. Would the unconditional withdrawal of a writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution operate as a bar to the filing of a second petition on the same facts and in respect of the same cause of action is the somewhat significant question which arises at the threshold in this appeal under Cl.10 of the Letters Patent.
2. Because of the pristinely legal nature "of the question aforesaid and the view I am inclined to take thereon, it seems wholly unnecessary to recount the facts in any great detail. Suffices it to mention that the issue arises from a somewhat insignificant dispute about the transfer of the appellant and the contending claims to officiate on the post of a Headmaster between him and the contesting respondent. It seems to be common ground that earlier the appellant had preferred Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 4505 of 1982 in the High Court for challenging the identical impugned order which was, however, unconditionally withdrawn on 2-12-1982. Thereafter he preferred yet another Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 4875 of 1982. This came up before the learned single Judge and he recorded the following order :
"13.12.82- It appears that the petitioner had earlier filed a writ application against the impugned order which after hearing was permitted to be withdrawn. Now a fresh application has been filed. In view of the fact that the petitioner had already filed a writ application and withdrawn the same, I am not inclined to entertain a second application in respect of the same grievance. This application is dismissed."
3. Learned counsel for the appellant in assailing the aforesaid order had contended that a litigant is entitled to approach the Writ Court at any time and for any number of times for the same relief because a constitutional right had been given to him under Art.226 of the Constitution. In other words, the somewhat tall submission forcefully pressed was that till the time a petition filed by the litigant was disposed of on merits by passing a speaking order, the right of the litigant was not taken away nor could he be precluded from filing the petition under Art.226 if his earlier petitions were disposed of without dealing with the controversy on merits.
4. It appears to me that the line of approach in the aforesaid argument is oblivious of a factor which is fundamental. It is settled beyond cavil that from its very origin the writ jurisdiction is discretionary. There is no vested right in a writ petitioner to secure the relief which he claims. It is well settled that the same may be denied to him for a wide variety of reasons other than the pristine merits of the controversy. It is unnecessary to be exhaustive and only a few facets of this aspect may be recounted. A long line of precedents of the final Court has now established the rule that a litigant approaching a Writ Court with gross and unexplained laches for a stale claim may be denied relief without even adverting to the merits of the case. Similarly, the Court may relegate the writ petitioner to an alternative remedy where it exists before rushing to this constitutional forum. Equally a designed and calculated suppression of material facts in order to get an interim relief may disentitle the writ petitioner at the very threshold from the consideration of the merits of the controversy on the golden rule that the litigant must approach the Writ Court with clean hands. The residuary rule that where interest of justice does not demand it necessarily, the Court may decline the issuance of a writ is equally well known. Consequently, the threshold question is whether the refusal to entertain a second writ application on the identical facts and cause of action is a sound exercise of discretion. I am of the view that it is clearly so.
5. What would next call for notice is the fact that this High Court under Art.225 has framed rules for the disposal of applications under Arts.226 and 227 of the Constitution contained in Chap. X
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